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Historical Developments 
Peasant movements and revolts of a more or less spontaneous nature have 
1: occurred in the past in Indonesia as a reaction to changes in the living and 
working conditions of the peasants that resulted in acute frustration for them. 
One of the main reasons for such revolts was the rapidly penetrating colonial 
economy, particularly in Java during the 19th century, with heavy demandS on 
the peasants for labo~r services and taxes. New land tenure arrangements 
introduced by the colonial government, such as the particuliere landerijen 
(privately-owned landed estates), upset the traditional system and created 
considerable discon:tent. Many revolts had strong messianic or millenarian 
overtones and some took the character of a kind of Holy War, such as the 
Tjiomas rebellion of 1886 and the revolt in Banten of 1888 described bySartono 
Kartodirdjoo 1 
In Central Java, in particular, the traditional and the modern colonial 
agricultural sector existed .side ,by side: the sugar factories leased their 
land, often different plots for each harvest, from the villages surrounding 
the mills. Too many landless peasants were attracted by the plantations 
giving the plantation owners opportunity for abuse, resulting at times in 
severe social tension. Traditional peasant leadership, not able to cope with 
these new problems, lost part of its influence, giving a chance to radical 
political groups to mobilise the peasants. Thus the Sarekat Islam (SI), an 
urban-based nationalist movement, inspired by progressive Islamic but 
including non-Islamic people, could gain considerable influence after its 
foundation in 1911. The colonial government tolerated the, 6I since the 
"complaint bureaus" it established could serve as a safety valve for rural 
unrest. However, the rapid growth of the movement soon encountered' official 
1. Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Cond'itions, 
Course and Seguel (The Hague, 1966); Ido, ''The Tjiomas Rebellion of ,1886: 
A Case Study" Cmimeogro, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 
1969) 0 
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measures to check it. 2 Since .local 81 leaci.ers basically could not clo much more 
than 'the traditional leCl.ders to get (3r.disfadion of the peasants' demands, the 
Sl lost many of its adherents as rapidly as it gained them. In cases where SI 
members came to some kind of organised radical action, this took the 
characteristics of the earlier millenarian movements, such as the TubanAffair 
(1912), the Kudus riot (1918), the lVladura disturbances (1919) and the Tjimareme 
Affair (1919).3 
After a group of Communist and Communist-oriented leaders4 within the 
Sarekat Islam had in vain tried to gain control over the organisation, a split 
occurred. The so-called· Red Sarekat Islam took most of the membership because 
of its radical approach in expressing discontent. The colonial government 
responded by imprisoning or exiling most of the top leaders, thus weakening the 
organisation. Since legal means of expressing demands were blocked, the 
remaining leadership divided among itself and influenced by the exiled, tried 
to organise a general strike and planned an uprising in 1926. Only the 
rebellions in Ba.ntam and West Sumatra made some impact. Both were related to 
strong rural grievances and, in Bantam, also had religious (Holy War type) 
imp 1 ica t ions. 5 
The rebellions were rapidly suppressed by the colonial government; the 
PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party, which had played the major role in the 
uprising, was outlawed. About 13,000 persons were detained of whom most were 
soon released. Approximately 1,300 persons were interned and over 800 banished 
to the penal colony in the swamp lands of Boven Digul. Many remained there 
until they were freed in 1942 to heip in the struggle against Japan. The 
"hard core lt in Boven-Digul consisted largely of villagers who, as was noted, 
2. Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, N.Y., 1965), pp. 7-12. 
3. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Social Movements in Java in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries: An Anc'1.1ytical Framework" (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, mimeo., 1969). 
4. A' Communist Party of Indonesia lias created in 1920 by Sneevliet, a Communist 
leader from the Netherlands. 
5. Ruth T. McVey, op.cit., p. 344. 
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I: 
could hardly be considered sophisticated Communists. 6 The fact that a modern 
political movement could gain such an impact in a highly traditional society 
in a relatively short time, indicated that there were problems in the rural 
areas which caused the peasants considerable frustration. 
The sociologist Schrieke, 7 '\I>rho ln1927/28 investigated for the Dutch· 
government the uprising that had taken place in 1926 on the West Coast of 
Sumatra, indicated a number of general conditions that seemed favourable to . 
the development of such movements. 8 He emphasised the existence of serious 
grievances among the popUlation and the hope of a solution expressed in the 
redemptive, magic word kemerdekaan, Freedom. 
The opening-up through road construction and the introduction of cash 
crops to replace subsistence agriculture had upset the traditional way of 
life of the peasants in the Minangkabau area. Although their income increased, 
their needs had grown more rapidly', resulting in frustration. This frustration 
VIaS also a result of feelings of inequality and acute resentment against those 
who had privilege and power and conspicuously showed it. The existence of a 
ne,IT group of people who had gained considerable wealth as a result of the boom, 
emphasised the social inferiority complex of the peasantry. The demands of the 
colonial authorities, and in some cases their arbitrary measures against any 
protest,stimulated the already existing resentment. 9 
Similar factors had operated or were operating in many other areas in 
Indonesia. Particularly in Java, several frustrating factors created a climate 
in 1,IThich the growth of a militant peasant organisation was possible. 
In Java as well as in other parts of Indonesia high social status \vas 
generally assigned to persons who were descendants of the early founders of a 
village. These were the families with traditional rights to the land. Over 
the years, however polarisa-t; ion took place. Some of the el ite became rich 
6. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism. A History (Praeger, New York, 
1963), pp. 19 and 34. 
7. Rapport van de Commissie van Onderzoek ingesteld b\j het Governmentsbesluit 
van 13 Februari 1927 No. 1a, partly published in Selected Writings of 
B. Schrieke ~ Indonesian Sociological Studies, Vol. I (The Hague, W. van 
Hoeve, 1966), pp. 85-166. . 
8. ~., pp. 160-66. 
9. ~., pp. 146-49. 
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vlhile~~manydescendents- of thcseoriginal-inhabitcLltbsfell to-the same status 
as the newcomers, mainly tenants and sharecroppers. This was a consequence 
of subdivision of lands for generations among sons and grandsons, so that 
only small plots were left. 'Many of these small plots then. fell prey to 
land concentration in the hands of money-lenders, either absentee or from among 
the village elite, through indebtedness and mortgaging. 10 Ina M. Slamet has 
quoted studies which indicate how, in the second half of the 19th century, ne1rI 
larg~ landholdings were formed by means ,of usurious practices by better-off 
farmers, onen religious leaders (hadjis), and other rich people. Land and 
houses of people who borrovJed moneY,at exorbitant interest were gradually 
taken over when indebtedness reached a critical pointo 11 
Partly as a reaction to deter~orating conditions, loosely organised mass 
movements had been created by several political groups, such as the Sarekat 
,Islam and the Communist Party •. In 1925 .the tri1ditionalist Moslim party 
Nahdatul Ulama was crea'lied. The 3 organisations mentioned were the first to 
rally some. mC3:ss follovdng. After the Communist Party was extinguished in 1926, 
"nationalist" parties of different kinds tried to organise mass fo).lowings. 
These were 'a variety of youth, women's, community, religious, student and 
other type o'f organisations, either local or national but mainly urban base'!d. 
During the Japanese occupation they were all brought under two central leader-
ships at the national level, one nationalist and. the other religious (orthodox 
Islamic). The organisational hierarchy of these, organisations covered most of 
urban and some of rural Java and obtained some effective power ~rom the 
12 Japanese in the form of arms. The new mass organisations, however, did not 
have much impact in the rural areas before the Second World v-Iar except in 
areas where contradictions between traditional Islamic and non-Islamic groups 
~vere strong. 
Javanese'! peasants belonged generally to two main religious currents, the 
sani ri, orthodox' Islamic, a:ri:d 'the abangan, a mixture of. an:i.m:i.sm, U:i.nduism and 
Islamic. elements combined in various ways. Factional divisions in the villages 
10. Ina E. Slame-\;, ''De Indonesische Dorpssamenleving" (Anthropologisch-
Sociologisch Centrum, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Voorpublicatie No.3, 
1968, mimeo.), pp. 39-41. 
11. ~., po 16; Soeboer Boedhisantoso, "Djagakarsa: A Fruit-producing Village 
near Djakarta", in Koent jaraningrat, ed., Villages in Indonesia (Cornqll 
University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967), p. 344, observed that while most 
rich farmer:=:; to increase their prestige became hadjis, which implied that 
they made a pilgrimage to Mecca, not aJ.l hadjis vvere rich farmers. Some 
became poor because the pilgrimage costs exhausted their resources. 
12. Robert R.Jay, "Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java" (Cultural Report 
Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1963), pp. 18-27. 
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g'enerally followed the lines of santri or abangan. Such divisions became more 
acute \vJ.th the appearance of political mass organisations whioh were formed 
along the same lin~s, rather than along lines determined by economic position 
and class. 
It \vas particularly in the period before and after the Second World Wa.r 
that polarisation between santri and abangan began to appear. This expressed 
:itself partly in the acceptance of new cultural items or the abandonment of 
others, such as a part icular type of music, so that dist inct ion between the two 
currents become more visible. Thus wajang, a traditional kind of puppet play, 
become more exclusively abangan, and "Arab style" band music typically santri. 13 
In the case studied by Jay the differentiation often divided the villages as 
a whole but brought greater cohesiveness to sub-units, neighbourhoods "'I'hich 
became either santri or abangan. Personal loyalties played a role in the 
process of differentiation. In other villages there was no sharp break between 
d iffe rent ne ighbourhoods • 
After the Japanese occupation the struggle against the Dutch colonial 
regime was initiated and four nation-wide political organisations arose, the 
Nationalist Party (PNI) headed by Suk.arno, the modernist Islamic r.1asjumi, the 
Nahdatul Ulama and the Communis;!; Party. Indonesian society then became 
differentiated into four alirans, religio-ideological currents, since both 
abang~n and santri divided themselves into a more traditional and a modernist 
\"I'ingo 
The four "religio-ideological affiliations" are of great importance in 
understanding the background of peasant organisations. As Clifford Geertz 
noted about ,the area in Java he studied: 
"The institutional agency of this new mode of integration was the aliran 
system. Aliran, an Indonesian word whose literal meaning is stream or current, 
has been extended in Republican Indonesia to signify what in English we call a 
social movement, an ideologically defined political faction animated by rather 
farreaching moral ambitions. In particular, an aliran consists of apolitical 
party surrounded by a set of sodalities - that is, voluntary organisations -
formally or informally linked to it. In postwar modjokuto the four parties 
lIV'ere the Nat ionalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia, or PNI), the Conununist 
Party (Partai Kommunis Indonesia, or PKI) , the Reform Moslem Party (Masjumi), 
and the Conservative Moslem Party (Nahdatul Ulama, or NU). With one or another 
13. For an ample description of examples see Robert R. Jay, op.cit., pp. 19-89. 
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of-these parties- -as- nucleus, an-a-l-iran was a-cluster of nationalist-- -
organisations - women's clubs, youth groups, boy scouts, charitable societies, 
cooperatives, lending societies, private schools, athletic clubs, religious 
organisations, 'labour and peasant unions, art groups, trade_ organisations -
sharing a similar ideological direction or standpoint and loyalty to the same 
all-Indonesia leadership. There was a PNI peasant organisation, a PKI peasant 
organisat ion, a r!Iasjumi peasant organisation, and an NU peasant organisation; 
there were PNI, piG, l!Iasjumi, and NU boy scouts, and so on: evem the kinder-
gartens divided up this ,-JaY. 
An Aliran \:rasmore than a mere political party and it was more than a mere 
ideology: it was a set of interconnected social forms which acted to group large 
masses of people into a generalized category. ,,14 
As Gunawan recently indicated, commenting on the aliran concept 
introduced by Geertz, the alirans were helpful in accelerating the breakdOlffi 
of the hierarchical relations of a traditional society and initiating political 
mobilisation. 15 The old relations were replaced, however, with new vertical 
ones, forms of patronage and not yet with a political mobilisation according 
to the horizontal lines of class position. The class structure in Indonesian 
rural areas was quite unclear and the growth of class-organisations therefore 
very difficult. 
The Rural Social Structure and its Deterioration 
That a mass-scale peasant organisation ~Ias not easy to create in spite of the 
severe frustrations which the peasantry suffered, was a consequence of the 
highly complicated and diversified land tenure situation in Indonesia. In the 
early 19508 Clifford Geertz observed for an area in Central Java: 
I~nder the pressure of increasing numbers and limited resources Javanese 
village society did not bifurcate, as did that of so many other 'underdeveloped' 
nations, into a group of large landlords and a group of oppressed near serfs. 
Rather it maintained a comparatively high de'gree of social and economic 
homogeneity by dividing the economic pie into,a steadily increasing number of 
minute pieces, a process to which I have referred elsewhere as 'shared poverty'. 
Rather than haves and have-nots, there were, in the delicately mated vernacular 
14. Clifford Geertz, The Social Ristor of an Indonesian Town (M.I.T. Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1965 , pp. 127-2 ; a recent study by B.Gunawan, Kucleta: 
Staatsgreep in Djakarta (Meppel, Netherlands, 1968, ph. 3), sees a relation-
ship between the existence of alirans in Indonesia and a similar phenomenon 
called 'pillarization' (verzuiling) in the Netherlands where labour unions, 
political parties,youth and other types of associations are divided along 
the lines of protestant, catholic and neutral, humanist, or socialist 
ideological currents., 
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structuur", in Buiten de Grenzen. Socio-
rof. dr. W.F.Wertheim (Boom, Neppel" 
of peasant life, only tjukupans and kekurangans - I just enoughs' and 'not-quite-
enoughs ' 0 ,,1 6 
Throughout Indonesia but also on Java the land tenure situa-I;ion varied 
considerably from ~egion to region. On the whole it seems that the situation 
for the small-owners deteriorated and the homogeneity, noted by Geertz, 
diminished in many areas, if it existed at all. Acoording to official figures, 
. . 17 
by 1960 more than 60 peroent of the peasants were landlesso . 
In several areas suoh as Bandung regenoe (lcabupaten) a rapid concentration 
of land in the hands of absentee landowners and the village elite has been 
noted, in some oommunities covering up to half of the arable lando Small farmers 
lost their land ·through indebtedness and their inability to pay the moneylenders, 
Nho then took over their plots. As a next step indebtedness led to forms of 
feudnl servitude. 18 As Van der Kroef summarised in the early 1960s: 
". 00 it is indisputable that a polarization of classes based on the widening 
distinotions bet,..;reen the landowning and the landless is 00. a social dynamic 
of major importanoe in contemporary Indonesia.,,19 
In one intensive field study made in the early 1950s in this area, in the· 
village Tjiboclas, the clifferentiatioridn the rural sooial structure was 
characterir::led as a split between the "serving" (mengabdi) and the "oommanding" 
(memperabdi), those being served~ Among the first category are (1) the landless 
farm labourers or farm hands, in Tjibodas oomprising 44 percent of the 
populat ion; (2) the peasants ,..;rho own no more than a small plot, a yard, on 
\"lhich the houses of their family and olose rela"Gives are built t altogether 
about 25 percent; (3) those who own a plot of 0.1 to 1 heotare of land, \..;rhioh 
is insufficient for the subsistenoe of the family so that they have to hire 
themselves to larger landholders or work on a sharecropping basis (this group 
is about 23 percent of the population in Tjibodas). 
16. Clifford Geertz, Agrioultural Involution (University of California Press, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), po 97. 
17 0 Q,uoted in Justus M.van der Kroef, The Communist Part of Indonesia (University 
of British Columbia PublioationsCentre, Vanoouver, 1965 , po 194. 
18. ~o, po 193 from case studies by Raden A. AdivJalaga. 
19. .l!?i1. J p. 194. 
20. II. ten Dam, "Co~pereren vanuit het gezichtspunt der desastructuur in desa 
Tjibbdas" , Indonesi~, IX, no. 2, pp. 90-96. In an English version of this 
article whioh appeared in Indonesian Economics: The Conce t of Dualism in 
Theory and Policl (The Hague, 19 1 , it was noted: "In this context the 
word 'serving' is used in the sense of 'submitt ing , or 'resigning oneself' 
to a person who gives orders or commands; provides employment, has others to 
serve him and in some cases extends protect ion" (p. 34~). 
-}-
'1'h8 r;reat m'-l;jority of-the popula-tion-,about -90-percent jwhich has no land 
or vcry Dmall plots, are considered those who serve and have to obey. 'rl18 
others arc the better-off landmmers, those who olm enough land for their own 
subsistence or more and those who utilise the labour of farmhands or share-
croppers. It was noted: 
IITjibodas is certainly an extreme case in certain respects. In most other 
villages in Java the percentage of lancUess people .and of peasants with un:-
economic holdings is decidedly Imver, and the antithesis between the landed and 
the landless may be less sharp. But the general tendency pointed out by Ten 
Dam, is manifest in many parts of Java. ,,21 
It is extremely risky to generalise from the case study of Geertz in East 
Java or of Ten Dam's case in West Java as regards the harmony or conflict 
existing in the villages between the different social strata. Some areas were 
more tradition-bound than others. In certain regions modernizing forces had 
entered a long time ago, e.g. through the introdu~tion of estate agriculture, 
while elsewhere the traditional more or less communal land tenure pattern 
prevailed. There .is considerable evidence t however, even from areas where 
tradition and harmony appeared to be strong, that after the Independence of 
Indonesia and particularly in the early 1950s the status quo was disrupted in 
many ways. Even in"Modjokuto", the area studied by Geertz and his colleagues, 
these disruptive forces were visible, although the forces of rulrun (traditional 
harmony) were still predominant, and contrasts between rich and poor in the 
22 
villages not strongly felt or expressed. 
The harmony in relations between villagers existed in spite of considerable 
exploitation of the poor by the better-off. Ten Dam explains this by looking 
into the mentality of the lowest strata, the farmhands and the peasants with 
uneconomic holdings 1'1ho have to work for others to make ends meet. It is 
pointed out that the poor peasants on the whole are rather distrustful and 
passive. They live by the day, preoccupied only by the food for the next day. 
They hC1,ve little ir.tterest in community problems and efforts in cOllll1T!lnity 
development and similar g6verr:unent programmes do not find much response among 
21. W.F. Wertheim, East-West Parallels (The Hague, 1964), po 267. 
22. See e.g. the study by Robert R. Jay, op.cit. "Modjokuto" is a 
fictitious name, not to be confused with the town of Modjokerto, 
and means something such as Middletown. It stands for the small 
town of Pare in the neighbourhood of Kediri, East Java. Geertz, 
Jay and ot.her Amerioan scholars did fieldwork in this area in the 
1950so 
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them. :lornotirne13 they may temporarily respond to meilDsianic movoments Duch an 
the flatu Ad.il. On the wholo, however, they are apathetic. Particularly the 
farmhands are highly dependent on their masters, whom they know and 1rllios.e 
patronage at least gives a minimum of security. They follow their patrons 
rather than those 1rTho come to defend their interests 0 They have nothing to 
loose and they have a correspondingly low esteem for the legitimacy pf the 
system under which they live 0 23 
The same was noted for the peasants with too small holdings. They may 
have more self-respect than the farm hands, but since the process of 
concentration of land in the hands of the better-off concerns them directly 
- having still something to lose -their feeling of frustration is probably 
stronger. Their social status is deteriorating gradually.24 
It was observed that both groups, landless and semi-landless peasants, 
accept their situation as unavoidable and follow the leadership of the better-
off and wealthy farmers. ThE! latter group is the one through which government 
programmes are channelled and whose position is strengthened through that. 
Poor peasants do not see a~ way to improve their situation by their own 
effort under those circumstances, and the facts seem to confirm t:p.eir 
suspicion. Cooperative efforts in Tjibodas undertaken with support from the 
government gave only few benefits to the poor peasants' and were on the whole. 
controlled by and to the benefit of the better-off farmers and landholders. 
Considerable apathy and distrust of the majority of the peasants towards 
official programmes was noted. 25 
Local government in Indonesia is organised in such a way that all officially 
sponsored programmes are channelled through it. Programmes generally operate 
at the kabupaten (regency) level through the bupati (chief administrator of 
lcabupaten), then at the district level (ket jamatan) through its chief, the 
tjamat, and at the village (~) level through the village .head, lurah. The 
administrative village is the lowest unit of local administration in which a 
great deal of power is concentrated. Villages have several thousands of 
inhabitants and consist of a good number of hamlets. There are almost 60,000 
villages in Indonesia. 
23. H.Ten Dam, oJ2.cit 0, pp. 90-94. 
24. ~., pp. 94-96. 
25. ~., pp. 105-16. 
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The key-figures in the local hierarchy as the lurahs, generally belonging 
to the wealthiest families in the village. Formerly a lurah's position was 
hereditary but since Independence they are formally elected by all village 
inhabitants over 18 years of age. Candidates are usually members of the 
village elite. A' recent field study noted thai; the election campaign for 
village head is so expensive that only the wealthy can afford it. The candiate 
is supported by.the "influentials" of the village 0 26 The "oounoil of 
influent.ials" whioh plays an important but not offioial role in village govern-
ment is a typically elite organisation which recruits its members through a 
oooptation system. The persons appointed by the lurah in the various committees 
and councils whioh make out the local government are practioally all from this 
group of influentials, terkemukas. 27 Onoe he is elected a lurahcan remain in 
office without re.-eleotion as long as he does not encounter the expressed dis-
satisfaction of the villagers. If the vililiagers are dissatisfied they have the 
right to petition the distriot head to dismiss the lurah. A meeting is called 
and a new lurah will be eleoted. A lurah oan also retire voluntarily, in which 
case he can nominate one or two candidates to suoceed him. Campaigns for 
election are not very open but are carried out informally through friendly 
gatherings in local centres where people habitually meet or in the people's 
• 28 homes. 
Koentjaraningrat desoribes for the village he studied in Central Java how 
the lurah directed the village meetings in a rather authoritarian way, but he 
\ 
noted that before the meeting which was held to discuss a certain problem 
formally, a great deal of informal persuasion, talk and gossip had been going 
. on in cbffeeshops and other popular gathering places, until a certain oonsensus 
had b.een reached. It was noted: 
''This system of oonduoting meetings is probably derived from a corresponding 
element in Javanese social behavior, in which public controversy must be 
avoided at all oosts. This attitude is further streAgthened by the patriarchal 
figure of the -village head; like a father, he Should never be direotly 
oontradicted."29 
26. J.Helmer and E.Weitering, Kommunikatiepatronen in een West-Javaanse Dessa 
(Thesis, Tilburg, Netherlands,. 1970), p. 17. 
27. ~., pp. 27-30. 
28. Koentjaraningrat, ''Tjelapar: A Village in South Central Java", in 
Koentjaraningrat, op.cit., p. 272. For an interesting oase study of a 
leader who was opposed by the villagers and had to make plaoe for a newly 
elected lurah see Robert Jay, opocit., po 69 ffo 
29. ~., pp. 274-75. 
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Changes were occurring, however, and Koentjaraningrat observed cases where the 
'tradi tional system was abandoned after younger men beoame lurahs, who did not 
inspire fatherly respeot and in politioal party work had learnt to direot 
meetings in different ways. 
In most cases the traditional lurahs maintained their influence, while 
their status was enhanoed by the fact that all government efforts (including 
oommunity development and later even the land reform programme) were more or less 
directly administered by them. It was the outspoken purpose of oommunity 
developl)lent and similar programmes not to disturb the village harmony existing 
under the traditional leadership.30 This approach seemed to function in those 
cases where the traditional patronage system still prevailed unsh~cen and was 
not undermined by modernising influences. 
Qln one case study/',of community development, it was observed that the;. 
oommunities in question in Banjamas, Central Java, seemed 
" ••• to have retained more of their 'feudal' structure than have village 
communities in other areas of Java. The term 'feudal' hare refers to the 
loyalties - initially stimulated by dependency - of the lower class people to 
members of the traditionally-determined higher classes in Javanese society. 
It is perhaps, this loyal attitude towards recognised indigenous leaders which 
for the most part accounts for the success of community development in that 
area. ,,31 
In some cases special circumstances stimulated the peasants to greater 
collaborat ion and mutual effort for improvement 0 Thus another highly successful 
community development programme was evaluated in a village which was often 
30. Selo Soemardjan, The Dynamics of Community Development in Rural Central and 
West Java (A Comparative Report, Monograph Series, Modern Indonesia Project, 
Southeast Asia Program,Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), p. 8, 
analysed among others an official programme which has carried out 
considerable grass-roots work in the rural areas, the Lembaga Sosial Desa, 
LSD (literally translated: Village Social Institution), of the Ministry 
of Social Affairs, and pointed out as LSD's background philosophy: " 00 • the 
Ministry 'decided that in no way should the harmonious life of the village 
community be, disturbed, not even by the process of community development. 
The only way seen by that Ministry to acoomplish development, without social 
disorganization is to manipUlate the stimulUS to actual progress in such a 
way that it will be regarded as coming from within the community itself"; 
see also Department of Social Affairs, The L.S.D.: Indonesia's Volunta 
Villa~ Level Self-Help pro,ram, Djakarta, 199 with a contribution by 
A.W.Bu.ckland, I.L.O. Expert 0 
31. Selo Soemardjan, op.oit.,p. 13 • 
... -11--
. 32 harrassed by terror from the Darul Islam. The cohesiveness which res~lted 
from the common danger and struggle that people had to face proved to be a good 
basis for successful community development. 33 
In cases where the old harmony was disappearing, community development ~~d 
. . . 34 ' 
similar efforts often met distrust and apathy among the poor peasants 0 Where 
such efforts mainly benefitted the better-off, they helped to sharpen the 
growing contrasts. On the whole there seemed to be few areas left where 
traditional feudal-type leadership was not being undermined gradually by 
modernising influences, which could be merely economic, increase of indebtedness, 
absentee landownership or more blattant forms of exploitation of the poorer 
peasants by the groups of better-off. Particularly the idjon system was noted 
for bringing the peasants under more dependent conditions of work, as was 
extenSively described in a 1959 article in PNI newspaper Suara Marhaen. 3§ Idjon 
implied that a peasant contracted a loan with the harvest of his plot as repay-
ment. Generally the price the moneylender gave for the produce under this 
system was iower than the nomal market price and cheating was very easy. 
Hardly any studies have been made in this field but the few that exist 
indicate a gradual deterioration of the traditional patronage system which had 
benevolent paternalistic elements toward a more exploitative type of relation-
shipo 'The study by ten Dam in Tjibodas showed that, as a result of old relation-
ships slowly being undermind, the emotional ties of the farmhands and tenants 
to their patrons loosened and first signs of a certain unrest among the peasants 
b 0 °bl 36 ecame V181 e. 
This process of deterioration of the traditional st.atus qUo was accelerated 
partly a result of the entrance of political parties campaigning for adherence 
arid the widening gap ,between abanganand s~ntri, related to this process (see 
above) 0 
New kinds of patronage and. control from above were channelled through the 
new political and civic organisationsalo:lJ.g aiiran lines during the early 1950s. 
------------,--- , 32~ The DarulIslam movement was initiated in 1949 in west'Java. and supported by 
guerilla forces. Itainied.at the establishment of an Islamic state by 
overthrowing the Indonesian government. By terrorising·' rural people and 
raiding villages it tried to force people to take its side. The movement 
harrassed several rural areas up to 1962 when its leader Kartosuwirjo was 
captured and sentenced to death. 
33. Selo Sommardjan, op.cit., pp. 23-30. 
340 See e.g. Ina E.Slamet, op.cit., ppo 49-50. 
35. Ibid., p. 33. 
36. H.ten Dam, opocit., p. 104. 
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Utilising the possibilities existing in this climate, one of the most 
spectacular peasant organisations of the recent history was able to emerge I 
the Barisan ~ Indonesia (BTl, Indonesian Peasants' Front). 
Origins of BTl in the Independence Struggle 
During the struggle for Independence, formally initiated on 17 August 1945; the 
peasants were united in one mass organisat'ion in which various religio-
ideological currents worked together, the Barisan Tani Indonesia. The BTl was 
created at a Congress which took place on 25 November 1945, shortly after the 
Declaration of Independence. It spread rapidly in those areas where peasants 
were dissatisfied with the system imposed by the colonial government in which 
the use of their land alternated between estate crops and food crops. These 
lands were either lands of the principalities (Vorstenlanden), bound to tobacco 
estates, or lands tied by short-term low-rental leases to estate companies 
(mainly sugar). The peasants and/or their villages were obliged to lease their 
land to the estates but revenues were low, prices being fixed by the colonial 
government. Peasants also resented not being able to cultivate the rice which 
they needed. 37 
The BTl took up this issue, about which peasants af all religio-ideological 
currents agreed and which was more appropriate for quickly rallying a mass 
movement than the complicated land tenure issue and the differentiation among 
large, middle, small and landless farmers and peasants. The issue was also 
a rallying point for the anti-colonialist struggle. The s~e problem, peasants' 
land being used by foreign estates, also existed in parts of Sumatra where the 
BTl spread its organisational activities in 19470 Because of the increasing 
radicalism of the movement and the growing influence of Marxist ideas within 
the organisation, Muslim leaders left it in 1947 and joined the new rival which 
had been created in 1946, sponsored by the Masjumi party, the STII (Sarekat ~ 
Islam Indonesia) Indonesian Islamic Peasant League), headed by Abu Umar. 
Moderate leaders of the socialist (PSI) and nationalist (PNI) parties remained 
in the BTl and'strongly urged the government to buy private lands and unused 
portions of estates and sell them cheaply to the landless peasantso 38 
37. JohnO. Sutter, Indonesianisasi Politios in a 
(Data Paper No.3-II, Southeast Asia Program, 
N.Y., 1959, Vol. II), pp. 365-67. 
38. ~., p. 474. 
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However, in the face of the issue of the conversion ofp~asant plots into 
estate lands the differences between the BTl and the smallerSTII were not 
sharp. Under pressure of both organisations a ConveJ;'sion Land. Commission was 
created in 1948, and a campaign launched to abolish the conversion practices 
and to protect the peasants' interests versus the estates. The campaign was 
relatively moderate since it was seen that a compromise had to befou:rid between 
the needs of the nat.ional economy for estate products and the peasants who had 
to lease their plots. It was clear, however, that the old oolonial arrangement 
under which, for each guilder to the peasants two guilders went as profits to 
the companies, was felt as unjust .39 
The BTl'was'not completely dominated by the Communists, but.it was 
practically eclipsed after the failure of the Communist Party to overthrow the 
Government in the Madium rebellion in 1948. After that event, many members 
joined the MURDA (Indonesian Proletarian Party) of nationalist-communist 
orientation where the ideas of Tan Malakka had great influence. In' Central 
Java the PNl organised its own first peasant organisations in 1948 under the 
name P'etani (Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia, Union of Indonesian National' 
Peasants), which held. its first Congress in 1950. 
After it became clear at the 1949 Round Table Conference in The Hague that 
complete independence would be given to Indonesia, the All Indonesian Peasants' 
Conferenoe was organised jointly by the BTl, STII and Petani on 22-23 November 
1949. It was demanded that, in order to solve ·the land conversion problem, 
cooperatives be established by foreign capital, the owners of plots and the 
workers, under government supervision. It was also dema.nded that estates whioh 
were confiscated during the scorched earth strUggle against the' colonial regime, 
be transferred to the peasants or their villages.40 
AJ,though in some areas there were serious problems and frictions between 
the local occupants and returning estate-owners, at the end of 1952 in Java and 
Sumatra 70 percent of the estates had been restored. Particularly in North 
Sumatra a serioUs struggle developed between the squatters on estate land and 
the government trying to restore the estates. Bulldosing or tractor.ing of plots 
and houses occupied by squatters was used as a means to dislodge them. A 
programme to resettle the squatters on land available elsewhere was discussed. 
A Joint Seclt"etariat of Peasant Organisations for Solving the Land Problem of 
39. ~., pp. 536-47-
40. ~., p. 567 ff. 
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. , 
North Sumatra was formed to defend the peasants' interests •. Mainly leftists 
participated, either Communist, Socialist (PSI) or left-wing PNI. 
After .one incident in which a few peasants were killed, a parliamentary 
commission came to the area, and finally special legislation was promulgated to 
solve the problem in a way favourable to the peasants who had occupied land, py 
giving them land elsewhere. In East Sumatra and also on about 200,000 hectares 
in Java, similar problems existed. Rights were given to those who occupied land 
before the actual promulgation of the new emergency law.41 
While some kind of united action by peasant organisations of different 
polit·ical-religious orientation regarding such issues as the ex-coionial 
estates existed on the surface, the strife .be.tween the different currents 
persisted at the local level and was intensified in some areas, such as those 
where the influence of the violent clash between Communists and Moslims had 
been felt .during the Madiun Affair in 1948.42 Another factor which caused an 
increase in local ~actional strife was the increasing competition between 
political parties in view of the future elections (to be held in 1995). While 
the BTl and the other organisations had rallied peasant support in areas where 
the estate problem existed, on the whole the mass of peasants .had been neglected 
up to the electoral campaign. The disruption which was introduced into the 
villages was dramatically noticeable in some community development case studies 
in Central and West Java. While cohesion and harmony and a rather solid control 
of traditional local leaders prevailed until 1955, the campaigning of political 
parties for adherents brought conflicts, "mutual suspicions and unfriendly 
actions", because of the internal different iat ion.43 
The overall impact of modern organisational efforts adapting to the 
traditional village patterns is probably best observed and summarised in an 
intensive case study in Situradja, West Java: 
"Since the revolution a number of organisations and branches of national 
organisation have come into being in the subdistrict of Situradja.. Considering 
the traditional wekaness of corporate groups, it is not surprising that this is 
largely the result of pressure from above, either official or unofficial. People 
usually join organisations to maintain harmony in lineal or oollateral ~elations, 
not beoause they see benefits to be derived for themselves or society from group 
activity. For example, government employees may join the party of their 
41. Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 695-771. 
42. Robert R. Jay, op.cit., po 76, noted the increase in tension between 
traditional Moslim and abangan in the village he studied, not far from 
Madium. 
43. Selo Soemardjan, 6p.cit., p. 38. 
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superiors, ~ sharecroppers thatof~theirlandlords. Some organisations have ended 
almost with the founding meeting; Borne have little more thana paper exis~ence 
in subdist~ict records, yet they may still be invited to send 'representatives' 
to be members of committees set up by the subdistrict office to work on the 
August 17 (Independence Day) program or other projects. The life, span ,of an 
o~ganisation and its activities depend on its leaders. The total membership 
seldom meets or otherwise participates in group activities."44 
The entrance of modern political organisations competing for followers and 
" , i 
votes without "giving much beyond propaganda in return has in many cases added 
to the apathy and frustration that apparently was growing regarding 
possibilities for pro~ress and development. In areas in Central Java such as 
that studied by Koentjaraningrat, relations with superior local bureaucrats at 
the district level were considered more important than ofuher alliances. People 
in those areas followed their established leaders in elections. The opponents 
and rivals of local heads voted for parties opposed to that to which the heads 
belonged.45 Also in this case it was ,noted that the influence of bureaucrats 
and lurahs was strengthened by the fact that all government-sponsored community 
development and cooperative efforts were organised from above through them. 
This fact and the traditional patriarchal attitude of the civil servants had 
as a side-effect that very little initiative from the villagers themselves 
emerged. There'was on the whole rather passive oonformity_ 
Under the circumstances it seemed rather difficult for militant peasant 
organisations to gain a foothold in the rural areas where no rapid change such 
as that related to the estate economy had drastically upset the traditional 
system. The village elite generally adhered, if abangan to the PNI, and if 
santri to the Nahdatul Ulamaor the Masjumi. However, their organisations on 
the whole were not very effective. For the Modjokuto case study area it was 
observed that the Communist~oriented BTl was the only organisation that had 
some serious appeal among the peasants.46 Neither the peasant organisation 
of the Masjumi, the Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia (STII), nor the NahdatulUlama 
. , " 
peasant organisation had any activity at the village level. One of theNU 
leaders commented about the lack of activity: "All the argument about doctrine 
44. Andrea Wilcox Palmer, ''Situradja: A Village in Highland Priangan" in 
Koentjaraningrat, op.cit., pp. 322-23. 
45. Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelapar, A Village in South Central Java" in 
Koentjaraningrat, op.cit., p. 279. 
46. Robert R.Jay, op .cit., pp. 95-100. 
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does no·t mean a thing, the party that first sets up an organisation that really 
does something for the peasants will win any general elect ion easily. ,,47 The 
STII had at one time started a rice storage place for the peasants and a rioe 
mill to help the peasants and build up the capital of the organisation. This 
was later practically the only thing left of the STII activities and was not 
seen differently to any other private enterprise by the peasants.48 
It has been noted that the Islamic organisations appealed to religious 
sentiments in their campaign for adherents, an approach which, in some cases 
such as Modjokuto, had an adverse effect. In this as well as other areas even 
bette~off peasants felt more inclined to join the PKI as a reaction to the 
orthodox soul-winning campaign.49 
Although in a number of cases such as in Modjokuto some members of the 
abangan rural elite were leaders of or sympathisers with the BTl or PKI,50 on 
the whole these organisations could not rely on traditional authorities and 
patronage for organising their following. Wertheim observed that at tinies 
wealth:? peasants had PKI insignia in their homes but that the great majority 
of rich peasants, dominant in the local patronage system, were of different 
political orientation.51 . BTl and PKI had to appeal to the aspirations of the 
poor peasants by showing them that their basic interests were distinct from 
the traditional religious and secular authorities, expressed in Masjumi, NO 
and also PNh This process of detraditionalisation was effectively promoted 
by the PKI and BTI.52 How this was done will be dealt with in the next section. 
47. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (The Free Press of Glencoe, Ill., 
1960), p. 171. 
48 .. Ibid .. i p .. 1720 
-. 
490 B. Gunawan , op.cito, pp. 37-38. 
50. Observation by Robert R. Jay, opocit., p. $9. 
510 W.·F. Werthe·im, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of 
Java"· (Paper for the International Conference on Asian History at Kuala 
Lumpur, August, 1968,. mimeo,), p. 5. 
52 .. Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia", 
Journal of Asian Studies, XXVI, 2, February 1967,pp.238-39 .. 
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The 'CreatTonof ma-peasaii.tMass Organisation. 'm 
After the failure of the Madiuri ,uprising the Communist' Party controlled peasant 
organisation BTl (:sarisan Tani Indonesia) suffered a considerable decline, and 
came under the control of moderate leaders. The Communists created the RTI, 
Rukun Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Association), as a resistance 
movement in areas under Dutch occupation during the Independence struggle. In 
1951 ,the PKI suffered another blow, when many leaders were aJ;'r~sted after stirring 
up labour trouble~In 1953 after Aidit had become secretary-general o~ the PKI, 
efforts were initiated by the Communists to come ,to a united front policy and to 
build up a mass organisation, particularly among the peasants. In July 1953 
Aidit published a statement regarding the "Future of the Indonesian Peasa.nt 
Movement", which focused attent ion on rural problema and the potent ial for mass 
organisation in rural areas. ' 
,The ,BTl and RrI merged in SeptelT\Qer 1953 as a first step toward a United 
Peasants', Front. Through the il,se of mi;Litant slogans Communists assumed ,formal 
control of the 200,000 member BTl. The BTl voted to join the RTI 1;lut retained 
the name BTl.. The Socialist Party members of the BTl then broke aw/:'l.y, taking 
about one-quarter of the members,and created the Gerakan Tani Indonesia 
(Indonesian Peasant Movement, GTI).53 
The 'strategy to be followed by the Communist Party workers and the BTl 
activists was developed by Aiditin his above-mentioned statement in 1953. In 
the first place the "ilTlportant and. serious survivals of feudalism in Indonesia" 
were d~nounced~ The survivals of feudalism were defined as, follows: 
,,( 1) monopoly ownership of the land by the big landlords ~ (2) 
in kind, (3) land rent paid in the form of labour and (4) the 
bearing down upon the peasants and placing them in a position 
land-rent paid 
piling up of debts 
of slavery. 1154 
Emphasis was given to the need to organise the peasants, taking as a point of 
, ' , 
departure their most strongly felt demands and grievances. It was suggested 
to create local organisations around suchdema.:n,ds,which Varied for each 
particular village or area. As examples were mentioned: low land rents, lower 
53. Armold C. Brackman, op.cit., p. 208; also JohnO.Satter, opocH., Vol. Ill, 
pp. 749 and 770. 
54. Repeated in clOSing speech by D.N. Aidit in C.P.I. National Peasants 
Conference, Documents, Djakarta, April 1959, Supplement to Review of 
Indonesia, 6-7, June/July 1959, p. 11. 
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interest rates on loans, lower state taxes, abolition of unpaid labour, 
prevention of eviction of tenants, giving unworked lands to the peasants, 
giving arms to the peasants to defend themselves against the terror of fanatic 
religious groups such as the Darul Islam, assistance in seeds and tools, an 
agricultural school for each region, improvement of old irrigation systems, 
more representative village government and many other demands. 55 
As final goal ',was indicated the distribution of land to peasants in private 
ownership, but it was seen that a strong base of peasant organisation should be 
first built up ar.ound the more immediate and urgent demands which could more 
easily be satisfied. Party cadres were instructed to identify in meetings 
with the peasants in each particular area or community what were their most 
acute problems. In order to achieve appropriate identification of the cadres. 
and the village population, the policy of ''Three Togethers" was followed: 
activists must "live together,elll.t together and work together" with the peasants. 
They must also help them in the solution of all kinds of practical day-to-day 
problems regarding rent payment, legalisation of titles etc. As Aidit indicated: 
"Only by practical work among the peasants, only by leading the peasants in the 
struggle for their everyday demands, demands that seem small, insignificant, 
unimportant, only in this way can 'party cadres and members have' close relations 
with the peasants and receive their trust~ Only by actions to demand things 
thai; seem small, inSignificant, llnimportant, can the peasants' organisations 
grow stronger, wider and more solid. il56 . 
"Small but successful" actions were seen by the PKI and BTl cadres as the 
best way to nrobilise the peasantry. As one PKI guide indicate.d: 
"After the peasant organisation is formed, quickly undertake concrete activities 
in defense of the peasants' interests, such as the distribution of fertilizer, 
seedlings and.tools at a cheap price, repairing the water channels, repairing 
the fish'ponds and distributing fish eggs, establishing cooperatives, sinking 
wells together, repairing the village bridges and roads, organising a death 
association, general education and education of agrarian leaders, defense of 
people brought to court", eradication of illiteracy, organising sports and 
cultural bodies, etc. ,,51 
55. Donald Hindley,The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (1Jniversity of 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1964), po 161. 
56. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 174-75. 
570 PKI, Tuntunan untuk Bekerd 'a dikalan n kaum Tani (Guide for Working among 
the Peasants , Djakarta~ 1955, quoted in Donald Hindley, op.cit., p. 174. 
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It wase-mphasised; howeVer, that lilla small but successful actions should 
be accompanied by stimulation among ~he peasants of the awareness that the basic 
solution to' their problems only came with the end of landlord exploitation, and 
that this couilld be achieved through organised st ruggle • Act ions that would 
directly affect the relationship with the landowners were not to be undertaken, 
however, until the organisation at the local level had gained enough strength. 
Then the demands for joint land rent agreements or for lowered interest rates 
on loans or lowered land rents cquld be brought 'up. 
Particuiarlysl.nce the drive to organise the peasants was also part of the 
struggle between the political parties for the first national elections to be 
held in 1955,. the strife between different groups.at the village level became 
more and more intense. The down-to-earth approach used by tb,e PKI and BTl . 
cadres was highly successful, and gave the Communist Party an unexpectedly 
stron.g position as one of the four largest parties in the country • 
. The National Political Effects 
The electioncampaign58 brought the divisions between ideological currents that 
had existed mainly at the level of political circles in'the urban areas into 
the most isolated villages. Out of the elections did not come a clear majority 
of one group but a kind of balance between four parties belonging to the two 
main currents, abangan and santri (Islamic): 
PNI (Natio~list Party) 
Masjumi (Modern ISlamic Party) 
Nahdatul;Ulama (Traditional Islamic 
Party) 
PKI (Commun~st'Party)­
Other smallpartiefl 
Among which PSI (Socialist Party) 
8,434,653 votes (22.3%) 
7,903,886 (20.9%) 
6,955,141 
6,176,914 
8,404,705 
753,191 
(18.4%) 
( 16.4%) 
"( 22.0%) 
,( 2.0%) 
" 
AI,though. it. is e~remely difficult to generalise for the whole of Indones.ia 
or even for Java, it could probabl~ be .sa.id thatma~ Islamic peasants 'who voted 
Masjumi or NU formed part of the traditional patronage of Isl~mic landlords, 
58. For an interesting descriptidm and analysis of the first national elections 
in Indonesia and the solemn way in which they were carried out ~ see Herbert 
Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Interim Report Series, Modern 
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell University, Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1957). 
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the hadjis, tied not only by economic bonds but also by loyalties which have 
religious implications. Of the abangan peasants, the small and middle farmers 
appeared frequently to belong to the Nationalist Party (PNI) while tenants and 
landless labourers appeared to be mostly inclined toward the Communist Party, 
although at the local level they were led ih some cases by abangan landowners 
or other representatives of the rural elite. 
There is however great variation from region to region, partly depending 
on the degree of impact of Islam. Other factors are the influence of the 
former Dutch colonial estate economy, whd:ch seems to coincide with strong BTl 
and Communist adherence. 
The continuing ra,{ilid growth of the Communist Party and Comimlnist-
oriented peasant organisation after the 1955 eleotions is obvious from the 
results of elections for regional assemblies in 1957, which showed an increase 
of 34 percent in electoral strength over 1955. Comparing the 1955 and 1957 
electoral figures it can be concluded that the gains of the Communist Party 
were losses for the PNI, rather than for the Islamic .parties. This indicated 
that the division between santri and abangan was rather stable and deep-rooted, 
while within the abangan current the domination and patronage of traditional 
leadership, the village heads and particularly the higher level bureaucrats 
(priajis) was diminishing. 
Over the next years the Communist Party and its mass organisations became 
the largest organised political force in the country and for that reason, at 
the elections in 1959, should have been entitled to form the Cabinet according 
to constitutional practice. For a Variety of reasons, however, these elections 
were not held and the system of "guided democracy" was initiated by President 
Sukarno. 59 It had become very difficult to form effective coalition governments 
59. Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia" 
(Memorandum RM-5753-PR, prepared for United states Air Force Project Rand, 
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal .. , Febr. 1969), ppG 5-6, noted: ''The 
PKI leaders had reason to expect even more from the next general elections, 
which according to law were to beheld in 1959. Many obs.ervers believed at 
the time that the PKI would emerge as the country's strongest political 
party, thus entitled by constitutional practice to form the new cabinet. 
If this had happened, the PKI would have been the first Communist Party 
anywhere in the world to gain control of a national government by legal 
peaceful means." As this report further indicated, the Army oco. "was not 
prepared to permit a Communist electoral victory and requested in May 1958 
that elections be postponed for sixyearsG" This happened and • ullin July 
1959, Indonesia's parliamentary system was replaced by an authoritarian 
regame backed by the Army, Sukarno's so-called 'guided democracy'. Showing 
considerable political agility, the leaders of the PKI decided to make the 
most of a bad thing and began to cultivate President Sukarno in his new role 
as a dictator, while cont inuing to try to reopen the 'parliamentary road'." 
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amomg:the-tli.ree--major-parties tPNI, Masjllmi and -NU), -while particularly the 
Army opposed the Communist Party becoming involved in the government. Since 
several regionalist. groups had staged rebellions in the outer provinces, 
accusing the central government of being too much Java-centered, the President 
needed the support of the Army to check these forces. 
In 1957 President Sukarno formed a government in which all parties were 
united under his leadership. In addition to the Parliament, a National Council 
was created (Dewan Nasional) in which political parties were counteir:1balanced by 
representatives of the so-called "functional groups", representatives of 
labourers, peasants, women, youth, veterans, the army, police, clergy, the 
outlying districts etc. The Army gained some influence in the political 
atmosphere through the National Council. This influence was much strengthened 
when in 1958 the army took over many of the nationalised Dutch enterprises, 
partly in order to prevent them falling into the hands of SOBSI, the Communi:i:lt-
. . 60 
oriented general labour union. 
Through its role in the functional groups, the Army tried to gain control 
over the mass organisations (youth, workers, peasants etc.) of the different 
political parties by means of Cooperation Bodies, but the President prevented 
the Army from taking leadership over the functional groups. In order to check 
army influence, the President needed the support of the Communist Party, since 
it was the .only group with a well-organised and disciplined mass basis among 
60. ArnoldC. Brackman, op.cit., p. 243; Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in 
TranSition", in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven, Conn., 1963), 
po 259, noted about the SOBSI: '~he principal federation was - and still 
is - the Communist oriented SOBSI (Central Labor Organisation of All 
Indonesia) which had been founqedin 1946 and was the sole effective labor 
federation in the Republic. SOBSI is composed primarily of industrial 
unions but also includes some craft groups; it is generally conceded to be 
the largest, strongest and most carefully organised federation with the 
largest number of full-time union leaders. Three other federations of 
importance in the 1950s were the KBSI (All Indonesian Congress of Workers) 
which claimed to be independent in spite of some PSI (Indonesian Socialist 
Party) officers; the SBII, which was started by the Masjumi Party; and 
KBKI, which was organised by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). The 
other federations were of less importance, some of them hardly being more 
than paper organisations." 
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the villagers and the urban low~rolasses. President pukarno at times utilised 
mass rallies whioh the PKI oould. organise for him. The PKI, on the other hand, 
was~ite dependent on the President's support to oope with too muoh Army 
restriotion of. its aotivities. In some of the outer provinoes PKI aotivities 
were banned by the Army and PKI leaders were arrested. However, beoause of 
their strong base organisations and eleotoral power, the Communists in Java,. 
won influential posit.ions in the administration of some areas and towns. The 
Army exercised increasingly striot oontroL Arrests of leaders and sympathisers 
d t t · d t· d· d A .. 61 ooourre a lomes an mass mee longs were rare an requlore rmy permlossloon. 
Further Growth of the BTl 
The First PKI National Peasants Conferenoe held in April 1959 was an important 
milestone in the campaign to organise the peasants. The efforts undertaken 
prior to 1959 were evaluated. Among the results discussed was the two-million 
increase of votes for the Communist Part yo At the Conference was also noted: 
"In regions where the Party has won an absolute majority, there have been 
not a few instances of legislation of peasant ownership over former estate 
lands that the peasants have long been cultivating." 
It was recognised, however, that "many peasants still give their votes to 
.. 62 
parties of the landlords and the compradores." 
The Peasants Conference then gave guidelines, based on former experiences, 
to the activists as to how to improve their approach: 
( 1) As one of the first and most important reasons for success was indicated 
the "going· down"movement. Party leaders and activists of differe.nt levels 
went to the villages and tried, through the ''Three Togethers" method to win the 
confidenoe of the peasants in order to find out exaotly what were the agrarian 
relationships at the village level, and to investigate the social and eoonomio 
oonditions of the peasants or, in party terminology: "to assess the strength 
of the olasse·s in the villages.,,63 It was emphasised that speoial attention 
61., See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Demooracy", in Ruth T.McVey, 
Indonesia, op.cit., pp. 335-41. 
62. C.P.I. National Peasants' Conference, )PoOito, po 4 (Opening Speeoh of the 
National Peasants' Conferenoe by Njoto • 
63. ll:!i<!., po 6 .. 
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Sholild"be given to thenu.mbe-r"ofpersonsandthe-size of landlords 'noldings, 
rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants, agricuHural labourers and 
other "classes".64 
(2) After winning the confidence of the peasants and becoming profoundly 
acquainted with the specific problems of the various kinds of peasants and 
farmers in the villages, actions had to be undertaken which would lead" to 
improvements ina gradual way. Such actions were "small but su.ccessful". As 
was noted: ''The peasants and especially the peasants directly concerned, must 
be convinced of the justice and advantages of every demand raised and the demand 
must be in conformity with the strength of the peasants' organisationo,,65 
It was recommended that the activists must "strive to draw in and arouse 90 
percent of the inhabitants of the village and must genuinely base themselves 
upon the poor peasants and the ag~icultural labourers and unite with the middle 
peasant s • " 66 
This approach was particularly important since on the whole government 
programmes, including cooperatives, community development and agricultural 
extension tended to direct themselves to the better-off farmers and village 
elite rather than to landless and semi-landless peasants. 67 
From 1959 onward the PKI and BTl tried to bring a certain diversification 
into the peasant organisations, which on the whole were large and heterogeneous. 
In order to be able to channel demands of specific categories of peasants in 
" , 
villages allover the country, three types of klompoks, groupings, were formed 
which were kept sriJalland limited to peasants of a specific type., irrespective 
of their political affiliation or membership of BTl. Thus, special groupings 
were organised embracing agricultural labourers, including farm labourers 
, '. " , , 
without land aml those who had a small plot but had to work for others to 
supplement their income. Another klompok consisted of tenant 'farmers, and a 
third kind of grouping of peasants who worke~ their own plotijo 
64. 
65. 
66. 
~. 
Ibid. , 
Ibid. , 
p. 6. 
p. 7. 
67. H. Ten Dam, "Coopereren vanuit het gezichtspunt der desastructuur in desa 
Tjibodas" , op.cit., pp. 105-15, gives a striking example of this tendency. 
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An important task in this context was the establishment of cooperatives 
of "working people" as opposed to the cooperatives in which the better-off 
farmers or even the landlords had the leadership role and the main benefits. 
THese cooperatives were to be for credit, production, and purchases and sales, 
and were to have an important function in the struggle against merohants and 
middle-men. Great emphasis was given to the need that demooratio principles 
be applied to these cooperatives so as to avoidlbeadership funotions falling 
into the hands of the traditional leaders, as usually oocurred.68 The 
oooperatives were promoted among the peasants in a gradual way, initiating 
through simple mutual aid teams in agricultural production, small savings and 
loan groups, groups for the joint purohase of inputs (suoh as ,improved rioe 
seed). Once the peasants were sufficiently convinced and leaders properly 
trained, full-fledged cooperatives were created. Cadre repo~ts indicated, 
however, that the formation of cooperatives encountered many obstacles. 
Through the production cooperatives, in particular, Simple efforts to 
improve agricultural techniques could be propagated, which would raise 
production without waiting for modern agricultural implements. Rice production 
could be improved through the "Fiv~ Prinoiples" Campaign, encouraging peasants 
to "plough deeply~, plant closely , giv~ more fertilize-r, improve seedlings and 
irrigation".69 
By 1959 270,000 cadres had graduated, from party sohools, but in order to 
improve the strategy and effeotiveness, oadre and leadership training oourses 
were more systematioally organised frmm 1959 onward. Regional and looal 
training oentres were created. Great attention was given to the study of the 
social struoture of the villages and hamlets, to experienoes of peasant 
organisations elsewhere, and also to simple agrioultural teohniques. 70 
Whenever a small but suooessful aotion of the oommunity development type 
was undertaken" the cadres emphasised that this was only a preliminary solution 
as long as more important structural oauses of poverty and lack of facilities 
remained, suoh as the exploitation by landowners and merchants. 
In the activities of all kinds at the village level Communist-oriented 
mass organisations other than the BTl, such as the GERWANI (Women's Movement) 
68. C.P.I., National Peasants' Conference, opocit., pp. 7-9. 
69. ~., p. 14. 
700 Donald Hindley, The Communist Part;y:, op • cit., p. 168. 
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andthe.Pemuda.11akjat_(People_'s30uth)_gaveactive . support 0 This-included-
activities for women that helped improve local conditions and strengthen morale, 
activities in the field of sports, recreation and folkloric performances etc. 
Traditional forms of mutual help were utilised and revived, such as the a~isan 
groups, in which each member.paid a weekly fee and each week one member was 
given the entire collected amount for some special purpose. 
To the common peasants, membership of the PKI or BTl did not mean 
intellectual conviction but rather a desire for land or a better share of the 
crop, or it WCj.S even a gesture of solidarity with a. brother who was already a 
member, or hostility toward a wealthy neighbour who was a member of the NU. 
However, in spite of the fact that the PKI and BTl respected religious 
traditions, even punishing cadres who openly made anti-religious propaganda, 
peasants in predominantly religious villages (Islamic) were more likely to 
follow their neighbours, including their landlords, belonging to the NU. On 
the other hand, in abangan villages even landlords were drawn sometimes by 
family and other ties into the BTl. 
On the whole, it seemed that in mobiH.sing the peasants the BTl had as an 
advantage over the peasant organisations related to other religio':'ideological 
currents (alirans), that the cadres of the other organisations were, less 
willing or interested to "go-down" into the villages. In several cases, however, 
the BTl also had its difficulties with its own cadres. As Hindley noted: 
"First, the more literate and politically conscious peasantf;l who tend to become 
cadres in both the Party and the mass organisations are often middle and rich 
peasants or even landlords, and retain the attitudes of their social position 
toward the poorer peasants.. Second, in the relative sooial peaoe of th~ 
village, ma~ cl3.dres, themselves of peasant origin, are loath to create social 
disunity in the. village or have failed to reoognise the existence of landlord 
exploitation •. Third, some PKl cadres have. tended to become landlords once they· 
become village officials, and to ignore the sufferings of the poorer peasants. 
Fourth, the educational level of peasant members is generally so low that they 
must be taught literacy and basic general knowledge before they can receive 
political training. And fifth, cadres from urban areas often do not know the 
regionalla:ngua:ge required, or are simply unwilling to engage in rural work.,,71 
Competition of BTl cadres with traditional leadership was not easy and the 
influence of some. of the other peasant organisations should not be underestil!,lated. 
Their active membership appeared small, but the leaders of the Muslim organi-
sation Nahdatul Uhlama and the Nationali~t Party (PNl) peasant organisation 
Petani, were influential people with great authority in their villages. As such 
they automatically had a large following. 
71. ~., p. 163. 
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The surprising thing about the spread and deveaopment of BTl and. its 
activities in Java is that it came about in a society still dominated by 
tradition and respect for established leadership t although first signs of 
decline were there. The growth of BTl was not due simply to the fact that its 
cadres were more active than those of other organisations. To systematically 
undermine the hold of the traditional wealthy leaders over their villages and 
to bring the people so far as to oppose that leadership on cruoial mssues such 
as land tenure, is a big step in a tradition-bound society. Two important 
factors in this process were: (1) the creation of awareness and (2) charismatic 
leadership. 
(1) The BTl rallied its members on the whole, it seems, in a step-by-step way, 
elaborating on values that existed in Javanese culture but had not had a 
chance to develop under traditional rule and control, values of the need for 
struggle between good and bad, as re~lected in the traditional wajang and the 
Ramayana story. There is considerable evidence that the PKI and BTl in the 
rural areas have utilised "progressive" elements in folklore and traditional 
culture, after a careful study of those elements, to make the poor peasants 
aware of their own interests and to show them ways to change the status quo.72 
It was a question of placing the emphasis differently than .washabitually done. 
It would be an exaggeration to say that there was a clear-cut introduction 
of class struggle, but there were certain elements of this. Taking up the 
examples of existing but hidden grievances against those in power, people were 
made aware that the harmony in their villages was disappearing or did not 
exist. As abuses and usury became more obvious through the modernisation 
process, awareness of being exploited was due to increase, and the BTl took up 
this issue as a means with which to organise the peasants as an interest group. 
(2) In addition to the existence of strongly felt grievances mainly related to 
a deteriorating land.tenure situation, strong new leadership was needed to rally 
the people against the traditional elite. Identifioation with the. fate of the 
poor peasants was the initial step to gain the adherence and admiration of the 
people. Some soholars emphasise the spiritual implications of charisma as a 
way to get a following. 
72. D.N. Aidit, "Launch a New Culture Movement in our Villages", Review of 
Indonesia, Vol. VII, 5-6-7, Mau-June-July 1964, pp. 31-32. 
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In a stiiCiy of religious atiitti.Ciesiil. Ceniral Java lVf1ilderempha,sised the 
importance of charismatic leaders, through whose intervention and guidance 
people experience a sharing of higher powers. Such a leader is a kind of ~ 
(religious teacher) and bapak (father figure) on whom one feels able to depend. 
Loyalty to him becomes often more important than loyalties to parents and family, 
which as such . are very strong in Java. 73 It is difficult to assess how and why 
one becomes such a leader. One has to prove oneself gifted with super-natural 
or other special qualities whioh are relevant within the traditional abangan 
religious context in Java. While the Javanese type of religiosity, kebatinan, 
can easily be a form of escapism of suffering, it seems that loyalty to 
charismatic and particularly gifted, able or courageous leaders can as such be 
a factor that rallies people in a struggle for improvement and change. Such 
leaders then can take over the "fatherly" role that landlords and wealthy 
farmers have traditionally played among the. peasants in their village. 
Once traditional patronage was undermined and new leaders enjoyed enough 
prestige, it' was possible to compete successfully with old leaders· in elections 
for lura'hs (village heads) and even higher positions in local government. In 
several areas, particularly in Central Java, BTl or PKI leaders thus gradually 
took over official ~ositions from the established elite. 
In spite of many difficulties characteristic of organisational efforts in 
the highly traditional rUral areas, the BTl was the most impressive ·of all the 
Communist-oriented mass organisations. While at the end of 1953 it started 
with a membership of several hundreds of thousands, at its Fifth National 
Congress iri1957 3,390,286 members were claimed; at the Sixth National Congress 
in 1962 5,654,974; in August 1963 7,099,103; and in september 1964 8.5 million. 74 
Peasant membership of the Communist Party was only a small part of that of the 
BTl, and rose from 80,000 in March 1954 to over 750,000 in December 1958, 
reaching 1,200,000 in 1962. 75 
73. J.A. Niels Mulder, "AI iran Kebatinan as an Expression of Javanese World 
View", Journal of Southeast Asian· Studies, Vol. I, 2, September 1970~ 
74. Guy J. Pauker, "Communist Prospect s in Indonesia" (Memorandum RM-4135-
PR, prepared for the United States Air Force Project Rand, The Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., April 1964), p.19. 
75. Figures derived from Donald Hindley, The Communist Party, opocit., 
pp. 165-67; Hindley noted that the figures were not conSistent, depending 
on the interpretation of "members" and ''Persons that can be mobilised." 
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The whole structure was organised in a centralised way. There were 
R.gional Committees in the provinces, Section Committees in the kabupaten and 
committees in the villages and places with less than 100 members. The local 
cells existing in hamlets, plantations or other basic units were responsible 
to the RC 'sO 76 
.' The Role of the Army 
The growing strength of the Communist and Communist-oriented mass organisations 
provoked a strong response from the Armed Forces. A PKI Party Congress to be 
held in 1959 was first forbidden by the Army but was later allowed p thanks, to 
the support of President Sukarno. The Congress was finally held 7-14 September 
1959 under strict supervision of the Army and was closed to the. public. 77 
President Suka.rno particiipated and expressed his agreement with .its objectives. 
In spite of harassment by the Army and strong opposition by local 
traditional or even nationalist (PNI) forces in the vilaages, the Communist 
organisations continued to grow steadily and in ways that were well within the 
limits of democratic procedure. The elections due in 1959 were postponed 
however, and the PKI had to identify even more with the President and his 
NASAKOM "populist" regime 0 78 Al though NASAKOM stands for the uni-ty of 
Nationalists, Religious People and Communists, the PKI was not allowed more 
than symbolical participation in the guided democracy government, in the form 
of three ministerships without portfolio, which excluded them from any power 
or decision making within the government adffiinistration. 
The strength of the Army was considerably increased in the early 1960s 
with help from the Soviet Union in the conflict with the Netherlands about 
West Irian, and particularly in a confrontation with Malaysaa over Northern 
Borneo. 
76. Guy J. Pauker, "Communist Prospects in Indonesia", op.cit., p. 37. 
77. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communist Policy and .the Sixth Party 
Congress", Pacific Affairs, XXXIII, 3, September 1960, p. 227. 
78. For an interesting description of the way in which balance of power was 
mamntained between'President Sukarno, the Army and PKI see Donald Hindley, 
Political Power, op.cit., pp. 242-44; about "populism" in Indonesia see 
B. Gunawan, ''Enkele Sociale Processen in Indonesi~", Ooat-West, 9, 2, 
February 1970, pp. 49-53. 
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The Army formerly consisted of local groups of resistance fighters against 
the colonial regime, generally headed by more or less charismatic leaders. Some 
of these groups had' been demobilised but others were integrated into the TNT, 
the regular national army, many chieftains being given the rank of general. The 
manner of its creation meant that the Army had roots among the population, 
particularly in the rural regions where it originated. As former freedom-
fighters, soldiers considered themselves to be the guardians of the people's 
interests. 79 
Army leaders were sceptical bout the development or lack of development 
of the democratic practices of party politics and general elections, in view of 
the st rife to which this led. They part icular ly feared the Communist s, knowing 
that if this group should come to power, the influence of the Army would be 
strongly curtailed. They also resented the Communist Madiun rebellion of 1948, 
at the time that the struggle against. colonialism was going em. 
The period of "guided democracy" and the many years of martial law gave 
the Army the opportunity to penetrate all sectors of life. As a response to 
several emergencies, mentioned above, the Army built up a strength of 350,000 
. . 80 
well-armed and trained professional soldiers. It is difficult to determine 
how much of the old spirit remained alive within the Army. 
At the same .time, the PKI and BTl survived only thanks to the President's 
support, and on the condition of accepting Surkarno's ideology into the Party 
programme, including the belief in G?d. Some authors speak of ,the weakness and 
"domestication" of the Communist Party as a result of this dependence. An 
advantage thlll.t the PKI had from not participating in any government was that it 
could not be blamed for th~ economic and social ills from which the country 
suffered, while all other large parties had to share responsibility for the 
increasing corruption and the deteriorating nati.onal situation.81 
At the SixthPKI Congress in 1959 it was affirmed 'that, although at the 
Fifth. Congress in 1954 peasants represented less than half of the members, 
they now formed the majority in the party.82 Thus, by 1959, the bargaining 
position and mass organisation of PKI and BTl were strong enough to enable them 
to successfully take up the land reform issue at the national level. 
79. B.Gunawan, Kudeta, op.cit., chapter 5. 
80. Ewa T.Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the PKI?", Asian Survey, IV, 
9, September 1964, pp. 1061 and 1064. 
81. Ibid., pp~1060 and 1069'~ 
82. Justus Mo Van der Kroef, "Agrarian Reform and the Indonesian Communist 
Party", Far Eastern Surve;x:, 29, 1, January 1960, p. 6. 
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Land Reform Legislation 
On National Independence Day, 1959 (11 August); President Sukarno gave his 
Political Manifesto (Manipol) address in which he outlined the "guided 
democracy" principles under whioh Indonesia was to be governed. A new land 
tenure legislation was also announced; in partial. response to the demands made 
by the April 1959 National Peasants' Conference of the rapdily growing PKl.83 
A principal demand had been a 6:4 division of the harvest between share-
croppers and landowners. On January 1, 1960, Aot No.2 was promulgated 
regarding Agreement on Division of Proceeds.84 This waS a, compromise since 
the division was not olearly established but was to be decided upon for each 
kabupaten by its chief, the bupati. Later, an instruction issued by the 
Minister of Agriculture stipulated that no share for the shareoroppers could 
be fixed below the minimum of half the produce of irrigated land, and that 
agreements had to be made in writing before the village-heads, who were often 
themselves landlords. Discont inuat ion of the, cont ract could be arranged thro'g'gh 
hisintervention~ 85 The agreements had to be made for at least three years for 
rice paddies, or five years for dry lahd. 
Another more or less direot result of the' strength and pressure of the 
Communist-oriented peasant mass organisation BTl was that early in 1960 the 
Supreme Advisory Council initiated a debate on land reform law. While those 
who represented the peasants, particularly the BTl and PKI, insisted on a 
"land-to-the-tiller" programme, practically abolishing sharecropping, the land-
lord interests in the Council were strong enough to bargain for a compromise 
and to maintain the sharecropping system, although under new regulations 
determining a maximum limit of land. Colonial types of land tenure were to be 
abolished altogether. 
83. For an account of the special interest of the Indonesian Communist Party in 
the agrarian reform issue and the reasons for this see Justus M.van der 
Kroef, "Agrarian Reform", op.oit., pp. 5-13. 
84. Act No.2, Year 1960, Re Agreement on Division of Proceeds, 1 January 1960, 
Art. 1; the translation of the titles of this and other agrarian reform laws 
are mostly from the C.A.F.I., Commercial Advisory Foundation in Indonesia. 
85. ~o, Art. 6. 
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In 1960, the BTl leader Asmu (who in 1962 became BTl's chairman) declared 
that land reform was the ultimate goal of the peasant struggle, but that a 
gradual approach would be accepted. While it was demanded that lands of land-
lords belonging to the Darul Islam be confiscated because these people had been 
involved in efforts to overthrow the government, "patriotic" landlords would 
not be affected and it was only demanded that they share. the yield with the.ir 
tenants on a 60 :40 basis • Asmu also demanded that the maximUm amount of land 
that a landlord would be allowed to have should be 5 hec·Garee of irrigated land 
or ten hectares of dry land.86 
On September 24, 1960, "Act No. 5 of the Year 1960 Concerning Basic 
Regulations on Agrarian Prinoiples" was promulgat~d. Its principles are 
summarised below: 
,,( 1) agricuJ. tural land is for the t illingfariner; 
(2) primary rights toland, e.g., individual private ownership, are exclusively 
for Indonesia citizens, but fGreignnatiol'lals can obtain seoondary rights to 
rent or to use land under the time. and ~ize limitations set by law; 
(3) absentee ownership is not allowed except for those persons in active state 
service and for other exceptional cases; . 
(4) the economically weak farmers should be protected against those oc~pying 
a stronger position. ,,87 
On December. 29, 1960, Act No. 5 was followed .by the "Government Regulation 
in Lieu of Act No .• 56 of the Year 1960 Concerning Fixation, of the Size of 
Agricultural Land. "It was in this Regulation that, in densely populated areas 
such as:Java, five hectares of irrigated rice paddy and six hectares of non-:-
irrigated land, were' fixed as the maximum holding of a landowner. All land 
beyond that limit would be bought by the government and resold to landless 
peasants. 
86. Asmu, "The Question of Land Reform", Review of Indonesia, VII, 7, July 1960, 
pp .. 30-32,republished from the organ of the BTl, Suara-Tani .. 
87. Selo Soemardjan,' "Land Reform in Indonesia", Asian Survey, Vol. I, 12, 
February 1962, p. 25. 
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The following determinations were made: 
Density of population per square Maximum size of holding 
kilometer wet rice paddy Dry land 
(ha) (ha) 
Scarcely populated 
· 
up to 50 15 20 
· 
Less dense 
· 51 - 250 10 12 
· 
Sufficiently dense 
· 
251~r- 400 7·5 9 
· 
Very dense 
· 
401 and upward 5 6 
· 
The density of population was estimated for each kabupaten. Decisions as to 
the maximum size of land were based on: 
( 1 ) the availability of land to be distributed 
(2) the density of population in each kabupaten 
(3) the type and fertility of land; wet and dry, irrigated and non-irrigated 
(4) the best. farm size in accordance.withthe capability of a farming family 
plus a few farm labourers 
(5) the level of agricultural technology. 
Since in Java there were relatively few landlords with more than five 
hectares,88 the ceiling of five hectares did not leave much land to.be 
distributed to those who were landless or had insufficient for subsist.ence 
(the official guideline for an appropriate landholding for a family was a 
minimum of 2 hectares). The ceiling was relati~ly high for Javanese conditions, 
where the average plot is about half a hectare. However,the law was seen as a 
good starting point and the BTl launched a campaign to acquaint the peasants 
with the new law and to make them demand its implementation. 
Land Tenure Situation 
That the land tenure pattern in Java is extremely complicated is shown clearly 
by the contradictory statistics .available. 
Hindley quoted figures given by the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs for 1957 
indicating that there were in Java 3,227,694 hectares of sawah (owned by 
5,788,247 persons; average 0.56 hectare per owner) and 4,369,099 hectares of 
. . 89 
unirrigated land (owned by 9,845,936 persons; average 0.5 hectare per owner). 
88. See Table I for 1963 figures. 
890 Donald Hindley, The Communist Part of Indonesia 
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 19 4 
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(University of 
Indicating certain discrepancies in the data, Hindley then quoted a Ministry 
of Agrarian Affairs table on the landholdings of non-irrigated land, amounting 
to 9, ~55,369 holdings, and another table on the landholdings of irrigated land, 
totalling 5,52:j ,691. He noted that the discrepancies in the 'figures were not 
explained by the Mi~istry's reports. 90 
A new attempt to evaluate the land tenure situation was made with the 
Agricultural Census of 1963, based on sampling. In the introduction to the 
Preliminary Figures published by the Bureau of Statistics in 1964, it was noted 
tha-c cer-cain errors and discrepancies might occur because of utilisation of -the 
sampling technique. 91 
A recent World Bank Report quoted figures of the 1963 Agricultural Census 
indicating -chai; the cultivated area pf Java consisted of 2,652,000 hectares of 
irrigated rice land and 2,006,600 hectare of dry land. The total was divided 
into about 7,950,000 farms, giving an average of 0.7 hectares per farm. The 
Report also emphasised that many smallholders were 'only nominal owners since, 
as a result of indebtedness, their land was controlled by wealthier farmers 
and/or money lenders. It was noted that there were so many sharecroppers and 
tenan-lis that one hectare' of land was often worked by as ~ny as four or more 
92 tenants." , 
The World Bank Report compiled the following table based on the 1963 
Agricultural Census. 
90. ~., p. 5; making the issue even more complicated, Karl J. Pelzer, '~he 
Agricultural Foundation", in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven, Conn., 
1963), p. 127, quotes a document, of the US Joint Publications Research 
Service (JPRS 5249) ut ilisingthe table used by Hindley regarding dry lands, 
as referring to the number ofsawahs (irrigat~drice :fi~lds). 
91. Census Pertanian 1 63 (Agricultural Census 1963), Report No.1, 
Preliminary Figures, Biro Pusat,Statistik, Djakarta 1964), p. IX. 
92., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, In-ternational 
Development Association, Economic Deveillopment of Indonesia, Vol. III, 
Annex 1, Agriculture, Report No.,AS-132a, February 12,1968, pp. 29~32. 
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Table I. 
Area of ]!'arm b;y Size 
Hectare 
0.10 - 0.49 
0.50 - 0.99 
1.00 - 1.49 
1 .. 50 - 1.99 
2.00- 2.99 
3~OO ~ 3 .. 99 
4.00 - 4.99 
5.00 -
Total· 
S iz.e of ltarms 
Farms in Java-Madura 
Number Percentage 
4,152,434 52.2 
2,147,708 27.1 
858,477 10.8 
350,889 4.4 
273,914 3.4 
88,636 1.2 
35,~83 0.5 
33,867 0.4 
7,941,906 100.0 
========== ===== 
. Definitive figures of the 1963 Agrioultural Census publ~shed in 1968 gave 
the total number of farms (units cultivated by one farm household, by it owner 
of the land or not) for Java-Madura as 7,935,109, oovering a total of 6,171,405 
hectares .. 93 
\{hile the overall Agricultu~l Census data do not deal with land ownership 
but with farins, more elaborate census data per province give figures on the 
percentage of farms worked by owners and those worked by non-owners ,tenants, 
shareoroppers etc., divided as in Table 11094 In West Java the non-owned farms 
are mainly sharecropped, in Central and East Java either shareoropped or rented 
. for a fixedamound.. In East Java a large proport ion of the non-owned farms 
are rent-free from state or village. 
Table IIo 
Farm holdings Flllly .owned Tenure arrangement 
West Java 2,155,437 1,307,008 848,429 
Central Java 2,638,216 1,643,338 ·994,828 
East Java 2,789,727 1,517 ,700 1,271,837 
Jogjakarta 328,589 193,358 135,231 
Jakarta 23 1 1:f1;D 20,559 2,581 
Total 7,935,109 
93. "Census Partanian 1963" (Census of Agriculture 1963), II A. (Biro Pusat 
Statistik Djakarta, 1968, mimeo.), table 1. 
94. Derived from prelimanary tables of 1963 Agricultural Census shown to the 
author by Bureau of Statistics but as yet not officially published. 
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Indonesian experts of the Agrioultural Institute in Bogor pointed out that 
disorepancies in the figures are partly due to the fact that in 1963, when the 
census through sampling was taken, many owners reported less land tha.n they 
actually had, fearing the effeots of the new land reform legislation (limiting 
holdings to five hectares, the rest to be expropriated). Another thing which 
does not come out in the 1963 figures is the fact that better-off farmers 
usually own the best lands since they are desoendents of the founders of their 
villages, and that, in view of the "threatening" land reform, they nominally 
divided large plots among close relatives. Additional complioations are that 
in the 196 3 Agricultural Census, house compounds andgarderis of Ie ss than O. 1 
hectare were not oounted, while in other statistics regarding land tenure they 
were. Speoialists and field observations indicate that a considerable number 
of peasants own, plots just covering their home plot and a small yard around it .95 
other factors whioh complicate any assessment of the land tenure situation 
are the traditional systems that exist in Java. One such system, widespread 
according to some informants, is the gade system in which small owners place 
their land at the disposition of a creditor in exchange for a loan. It is not 
a pawn because acoording to tradition the creditor is entitled to use the land 
until the debt hasbe,enrepaid. Many relatively large farm units. are composed 
of plots controlled under this system by the farm operator, who does not 
nominally own the plots. 96 In the statistios regarding farm-holdings they 
figure as one farm,' olassified as partly-owned if the farmer owns one of the 
plots he operates direotly or with farmhands. On the other ,hand, the ,land of 
the owner ofanumber of plots which are worked by share o roppe rs "does not figure 
as one farm-holding in the statistios, exoept for the plot 9r pa:rt of his 
property that the owner works himself direotly or with farmhands. The number 
of farmhands is not ment ioned in the Agricultural Census 0 Aocording to a 1968 
report of the Mi.nistry of Manpower there are 3.1 million landless agricultural 
workers,' (buruh-tani) 0 97 
95. Aocord:ing to one source, this constitutes about 18 percent of the total 
farmland of Java. John E. Metoalf, ~he Agricultural Economy of Indonesia, 
po 39, u.s. TIepartment of Ag~iculture, quoted by International Bank for 
Reoonstruction and Development, op.cit., p. 29. ' , 
96. Information supplied by specialists in the Direotorate-General of Agrarian 
Affairs of the Department of Home Affairs (in oharge of land reform) and 
the Agricultural Institute of Bogor. 
97. Arrie Benggolo ,"Report on the Manpower Situation in Indonesia" (Delivered 
to the Tenth International Manpower Seminar, May 27-August 17, 1968, 
Washington D.C~, Ministry of Manpower No. 922/Ppt/1968, Mimeo.), p. 3. 
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The 1~63 ·land tenure statistics for Java (including Madura) indicate that 
of the total of 7,950,000 farms over 4,000,000 are between 0.1 and 0.5 hectares. 
This means that a large part of their operators will have to work for others or 
find non-agricultural employment to supplement their income. The fact that 
there is a large group, a little over 2,000,000 peasants, who work between 0.5 
and 1 hectare of land indicates that there is no clear break between those who 
have to work for others and those who do not. There is a considerable sector 
which, during p·art of the year,employs helpers, while at oth,er seasons members 
of this sector supplement their inoome. by working for others. 
Another complication is that a considerable number of peasants who 
officially own a small plot of land, in reality work for others on their own 
plot in oases where their plot is pawned in some way and controlled by a money-
lender or wealthier neighbour. The poorest group which, acoording to specialists, 
is oonstantly inoreasingin Java is the group of farm hands; landless laboureres, 
who only work for others. The 16,000,000 people working in agrioulture,forestry 
and fishing in Java (and Madura) are distributed as follows: 
Table III. 
Total Males 
.. 
Independent workers 7,479,000 6,451,000 
Employers 204,000 167,000 
Employees 4,522,000 2,420,000 
Unpaid family workers 3,802,000 1,991,000 
Others 33,000 20,000 
16,040,000 11,049,000 
Souroe: Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional (November 1964-Bebruary 1965), Central 
Bureau of Statistios. 
While current statistics are not very reliable ,comparative data to show 
how the land tenure situation has changed over the years are not available at 
all. However, probably even more significant than the rather preoarious 
agrioultural conditions of Java has been their constant and gradual d.eterioration 
.. 8 . 
noted by some eXperts. 9 The frustration resulting from this process may 
explain the willingness of the peasants to join radical pressure groups suoh as 
the BTl. The demand for land redistribution and a more equitable sharecropping 
98. About this process, called "agricultural involution", see Clifford Geertz, 
Agrioultural Involution, op.cit. 
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arrangement apparently had. a ~irong appeal» which explains why the BTl grew 
between 1953 and 1964 from 800,000 to over 8,000,000 members. 
One observer noted: 
"Land reform is a complex question on which little data is available. Large 
landholdings are rare in Indonesia, especially in Java, where thePKI 
concentrated its attent.J.on. But holdings of more than two hectares have, 
apparently 'been on the increase in recent years; severe inflation may well 
have strengthened this trend. Moreover the ownership of larger holdings is 
often associated with money lending, which can involve a separation between 
ownership and control, with the concentration of control over land probably 
being more extreme than the concentration of actual ownership. "99 
Regulations regarding Implementation of the Reform Law 
Not only the statistics. regarding land tenure formed a shaky basi~ :['or an 
agrarian reform progranune. Land reform legislation as it came into being over 
tb.~ years was also rather c9mplicated, making effective implementation difficult. 
This legislation was laid downin,a considerable number of laws, d~crees and 
regulations, promulgate~ over the years 1960-64 and each dealing with specific 
issues. The first (No. 2 of 1960) dealt only with the sharecropping problem. 
During 1960, as.noted above, laws regarding basic regulations on agrarian 
principles and fixatmon of the maximum holding of agricultural land were 
promulgated. 
Another serious problem to be tackled by legislation was that of land 
.owned by very small holders but .controlled through indebtedness by money-lenders 
or wealthi~r farmers: the harvest was used to pay the interest (at excessively 
high rates) or. to repay the loan.. Law No. 1 of 1961 stipulated that after 
paying interest for seven years the official owner of the land could automatically 
. ." 100 .. 
get back his land. 
Regulations regarding the actual implementation ~f the reform progranune 
came out in the course of 1961. The main executive bodies were officially 
create'din Ap~il 196<1 and consisted of hierarchy of Land Reform Conunittees: 
a Cent~al co~ittee headed by the pre~ide~t, provincial conunittees under the 
respectivegov~rnors, kabupaten (regency) conunittees u~d~r 'the bupati, district 
conunittees under the tjamat, and ~illage land reform co~ittees u'nder chairman-
ship of the. lurah. The kabupat,en conunittees were the most important in the 
execution of the actual programme. 
99. K.D. Thomas, "Political and Economic Instability: the Gestapu and its 
Aftermath",' in T.K. Tan, editor, Sukarno's Guided Indonesia.(The Jacaranda 
Press, Brisbane, Australia, 1967), p. 118. 
100. B.Gunawan, Kudeta, op.cit., p. 9~. 
The lr..abupaten, or Second Grade Regional Land Reform Committees, were 
headed by the bupati and the Chief of the Agrarian Office as chairman and 
executive secretary respectively, and further oontained 16 heads of government 
servioes related to agriculture. The latter oategory included an officer 
appointed by the Military Administration, the chief of police and the public 
prosecutor of. the kabupaten. Also, representatives of the four largest peasant 
organisations formed part of the kabupaten Land Reform Committee. The 
organisations mentioned in the annexes and regulations following the decree 
were PETANI (of the Nationalist Party), PERrANU (of the Orthodox Islamic Party 
Nahdatul Ulama) and the BTl. 
The tasks of the Seoond Grade committees included: to execute instructions 
of the Central Land Reform Committee; to regulate the registration of land; to 
regulate the taking-over of surplus land by the government; to deter~ine form, 
amount and manner of reimbursement; to fix the priorities of persons to get 
land; to guide and supervise the ketjamatan (district) and village land reform 
. 'tt . 101 comm~ ees. . 
The bupati was made responsible for the selection of committee members at 
the ketjamatan and village levels. Also at those levels a few representatives 
of large peasant organisations were on the committees. For the village level 
it was stipulated: '~he membership of the Village Land Reform Committee is left 
to the disoretion of the Second Grade Regional Land Reform Committee with the 
understanding that progressive figures and representatives of peasant 
.. 102 
organisations participate and should comprise at the most five. members .• " 
The fact that the existing civil administration played an important role 
at all levels was no guarantee for the effeotiveness of the reform. Most 
villagehaads were themselves large landholders and although a few representatives 
of peasant organisations participated in the committees, the PETANI and PERrANU 
representatives were often also landowners. The World Bank noted that, on the 
whole, representatives of potential beneficiaries did not playa significant· 
role on the committees, contrary to what happened elsewhere, as in J~pan or 
Taiwan. 103 The only way that the peasants could exercise pressure was generally 
101. Presidential Decree No. 131 of 1961 re Organisation for the Implementation 
of Land Reform, April 15, 1961, Art. 6. 
102. ~., Art. 8. 
103. I.B.R.D., op.cit., po 35. 
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througlithe-BTT membiHoi1. -the IandReforni Conimittee ,backedby the organised 
strength and potential bargaining power of his group. In Bome areas .in Central 
and East Java where the BTl and Communist Party had won elections for local 
officials such as lurahs, the situation was more favourable to the peasants. 
For the actual implementation of the reform programme in September 1961, 
Regulation No. 224 was promulgated. As lands to be distributed were indicated: 
(1) lands in excess of the maximum limit; (2) lands of absentee'owners; 
(3) lands of principalities and ex-principalities; (4) other lands directly 
administered by the government. It waS stipulated that absentee owners, those 
who. resided outside the ketjamatan where their lands were located, had to 
trans'fer their land to inhabitants of that ketjamatan or it would be taken over 
by the government ~ 104 As indemnification for lands taken over bythegovern-: 
ment (excess land or absentee owners land) would be given: for the first five 
hectares ten times the annual net proceeds, for the second, third and fourth 
five hectares nine times the annual net proceeds and for the rest seven times 
the annual net proceeds. 105 This indemnification would be given 10 percent in 
savings at the Bank Koperasi Tani dan Nelajan (Cooperative Bf3.nk for Peasants 
and Fishermen) and the remainder in lan~ reform promissory notes. .The savings 
could be. taken out one year after the land had actually been dist~ibuted. 106 
In the distribution of land to peasants, priority would be given to the 
tillers cultivating the land in question and the regular peasant workers of 
the ex-owners.' Special priority would be given to veterans and widows of fallen 
independencefightersr.;107 Beneficiaries would· have 16 . years in which to pay 
the government .the price tbo be reimbursed to the former owner fo:rthe 
distributed land~ The beneficiaries were obliged to join cooperatives through 
h 
. '. . 100 
whic they would receive credit from the Bank Koperasi Tani dan Nelajan. 
Landowners who rejected or boycotted the taking-over by the government of their 
exqess.lan¢lfor. distribution to peasants, would be punished by three months' 
detention. 'and no indemnificatiop. for the land. 109· 
104. Government Regulation No~224 Year 1961 re Implementation of Land 
.Distribution and Payment of,Indemnification, September 19,1961, Art. 3. 
105. ~., Art. 6 .. 
106. ~o, Art. 7· 
107. ~., Art. 8. 
108. ~., Art. 17. 
109. Ibid. , Art. 19. 
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The activities of the land reform committees did not start until 24 
September 1962, the second anniversary of the basic agrarian law's promulgatioJ1° 
Compared with similar efforts in other countries, the pubfbity given to land 
reform legislation by the authorities and even the Communist Party demonstrated 
l 'ttl ' 111 1 e aggress1veness. 
The first stage of the land reform programme was to be implemented in Java 
and the Lesser Sunda Islands. In the course of 1963 the kabupaten land reform 
committees in th"is area calculated that 337,445 hectares of land (including 
national domain) were available for distribution. It was noted that this small 
amount of land was due to. the high ceiling (of 5 HA) 'and particularly the 
leniency toward absentee landowners in this programme area. Much sawah land 
belonged to absentee landowners who lived in towns in Central .Java. 112 
Chances·for· conflict between owners and potential beneficiaries were 
enhanced by the former's reaction to the first steps of land reform law 
implementation: determination of the available quantity of surplus land.' As 
the World Bank Report noted: 
"Observations. in the Javanese countryside in 1964 pointed to many evasions of 
the permissible retention. There was no clearly stated proviEilion .that to 
escape redistribution, ownership of a parcel of land had to antedate the reform 
by a specified ·date. Lacking this" normal subdivision of a holding became as 
standard in Indonesia as it is elsewhere whenever ceilings or .own~rship are 
introduced. ,,113 . . . 
. In a!idition to the fact that the land reform committees :were often 
. . .... 
domiriateq, by rep~sentativesof the local elite and were biased in favour of 
110. E. Utre'eht, "Land Reform in IndoneSia"', Bulletin. of Indonesian Economic 
Studies, V,. 3, Canberra, November 1969, p. 77; a highly interesting account 
of the various laws and the reform procedure can be found irithe Indonesian 
language in Boedi Harsono SH, Undang=Undang Pokok ~graria (Djambatan, 
Djakarta, t!tird print ing, 1970). '. .' . 
111. I.B.R.D. ,o·pecit., p. 35. 
112. E. Utrecht, .op.cit .. , p.78; 'Selo Soemardjan, opocit., p. 28 notedZ''There 
are as yet no exact figures available on the number of absentee owners of 
agricul tural land, but it may safely be assumed there' is a positive 
relationship between that number and the proximity of large cities." 
113. I.B.R.D., op.cit., 'p. 37, concludes: ''However, the real: issue is not this 
type of evasion but that under the Javanese conditions the oeilingwas too 
high. Fixing the permissible reterition at 5 hectares for Java was flying 
in the face of reality." . . 
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. the larg-er iand6W:iiers, -'theyCwerealso liable to oertain forms of corruption. 114 
Both fact6rsinterfered with effective implementation ·<nfthe reform programme. 
Radical Peasant Pressure and Its Effects 
In reaction to the slow and defective implementation of the land reform and 
the determination of which surplus lands were to be expropriated, the BTl and 
PKI (Communist Party) stepped-up their activities and became more militant, 
risking the more or less harmonious collaboration that existed at the national 
level between them and the various other political currents. 
At a December 1963 meeting of the Central Committee of the PKI~ the 
slowness of land reform implementation was vigorously denounced. Figures were 
presented indicating that of over 200,000 hectares of surplus land registered, 
less .than 20,000 .hectares had been actually distributed in the country as a 
whole. Aidit stated that completion o~ the programme, continuing in this 
rhythm, would 'last until the year 2000. 115 
In order to pressure the speeding-up of the reform programme Aidit endorsed 
and encouraged in his report the so-called ''unilateral action movement" 
. . ". 116 (Gerakan Aksi Sefihak) of the peasants. It is difficult to assess whether 
this movement was instigated by BTl or PKI leadership, or was' a spontaneous 
reaction by the peasants to doubtful practices ahd unilateral actions by land-
owners, such as eviction. 117 The ''unilateral actions" were initiated somewhere 
in 1963 by peasants as well as landlords and generally implied not awaiting the 
decision of the Land Reform Committee but taking the law into one's own hand. 
114. FO,r a re,cent case study see: J. Helme.r and E •. Weitering, K6mmun.ii:katie-
atronen in .een West,...Javaans.e Desa(thesis, University of Tilburg, Nether-
lands, 1970, miqieo. , po 43 •. 
115. Guy J. Pauker, "Political Consequences of Rural Development Programmes in 
Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, XLI,. 3, Fall 1968, pp. 388-90. B. Gunawan, 
Kudeta, opocit., pointed out that Aidit's statement was exagg-erated and 
apparently used as political propaganda; the figure 200,000 probably only 
refers 'to'''land expropriablefrom landlord,sand does not include the 130,000 
hectares of national domain and principalities land given in official 
figures regarding distribum.able land. 
116. The report was later published as: Aidit, Set Afire the Banteng Spirit 
(Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1964)., . 
117. Werthei~suggest~d that in relation to the crucial land tenure issue the 
BTl may have followed a somewhat more radical line than thePKI; see 
B. Gunawan, Kudeta, op.cit., p. 207, note 4. 
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Utrecht gave the following examples: 
II(a) A landowner learn~ that one of his labourers has on his own initiative or 
at the instigation of the BTl, requested the local land reform committee to 
assign to him the property rights over the stretch of land. that he tills. 
Without waiting for the decision of the committee, the landowner tries to oust 
his dangerous labourer. The latter seeks help from the BTl if it was not behind 
him already~ Then the landowner reports what is going on to the Petani. The 
Petani advises him to issue an ultimatum as to the date on which the labourer 
has to leave his field. But one morning, some days before the ultimatum is due, 
the landlord discovers on his field a crowd of 100 or more BTl members armed 
with sticks, ho~s and sickles and working together. Off he hurries to the local 
board of Pet ani and after some time he returns accompanied by a band of petani 
members as big as or bigger than the BTl crowd on his field and provided with 
all sorts mf weapons as well. A battle is fought and victims fall under the 
knives and the hoes or by the bullets of army or police units who have meanwhile 
intervened. . 
(b) A labourer, thinking that as a sha'recropper he has a right to the field that 
he hcis already applied for to the locai land reform committee, without awaiting 
the decision of the committee, refuses to hand in a part of the harvest· to the 
landowner. (Not infrequently this happened on the advice of the BTl). The 
landowner, suppo~ted by Petani, then tries to get rid of his labourer by 
intimidating him. A mass of BTl members comes to the labourer's assistance and 
a fight develops. 
(c) A landowner does await the decision of the land reform committee concerning 
a dispute on a. stretch of his land, either because he is convinced that he will 
win the affair on objective , factual and legal grounds or because he feels· 
assured of the support of some influential committee members who may have a 
party or. ta . family relationship with him. Here again, the labourers; encouraged 
and supported by the BTl, frequently take matters into their own hands by mass 
occupation of the disputed field. ,,118 . 
Utrecht then drew the conclusion: 
"If one takes failure to await the decision of the committee as the criterion, 
direct action was· liable to be resorted to by either side,and not, as was 
often said, only by the landless peasant. The organisation that sided with the 
party who had taken the initiative without awaiting the decision of the 
committee accused the opponent of hcivingacted provocatively. This, was often 
true, which clouded the issue still more. II119 
While unilateral actions of the lC!Jldowners tried to avoid l~nd distribution 
or the peasants claiming their new rights, unilateral actions of the peasants 
were directed toward the initiation and acceleration of the land distribution 
process. The tactic mostly.used by peasants was occupation of the lands to 
which landle.ss peasants .were entitled according to the law. By occupying 
certain plots of land the peasants involved tried to indicate which lands were 
to be distributed and to whom, thus forcing the land reform committee in charge 
118. E. Utrecht, op.cit., pp .. 81-82. 
119. ~. (my italics). 
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to speed up its decision. A complication was that BTl members who occupied a 
certain plot to 1?e dil?tributed, were not always those peasants who had a right 
to the land according to the legally established list of p~iorities (f.irst 
tenants tilling the land in question; second, workers cultivating the land, 
etc.).· lnseveral cases the BTl favouredit.s members over members of a smaller 
peasant organisation even if the latter had priority according to the 
I t · Th . d fl' t . .. 120 regu a J.ons. J.S cause con J.C J.n some cases. 
Another. issue to which unilateral actions of peasants were directed was. 
related to the sharecropping regulations. When the first three years after the 
promulgation of the sharecropping law had passed and the three-year contracts 
between shm:recroppersand owners terminated, sharecroppers did not want to 
retu,rn back the. land they had been cultivating when the owner desired it and 
simply refused en bloc to leave. According to informants, this happened in 
1964 .and 1965 on a rather large scale.. The owners had. the legal right to take .. f • 
back their lands for cultivation but in many cases BTl action prevented.them 
from 'doing so 0 
One immediate effect of unilateral actions demanding fulfilment of share-
croppers agreements was probably that, on 2nd Maroh 1964, Regulation No.4 of 
, . 
the Minister of Agrarian Affairs was promulgated, laying doWn. meaBU.res. against 
landowners who 9.id not :roHow up the stipulation~ of the. bupati regarding 
sharecropping. Landowners could be denounce.d to .the village land reform 
committee. To punish those found guilty of violating .the legal arrangements 
for division ()f the :pro,?eeds (mostly on a 50:50 basis), the Regulation 
stipu!ate.t?-. that 60.p~rcent of·the harvest would be for the tiller,. 20. PElrc:ent 
for the larictowner and 20 percent for the Ketjamatan Land Re:t:ormCommittee. This 
. . ',\.' .' .' . 
was made retroactive to 1st January 1964. 
At times the question arose against whom peasant action should be directed, 
. . 
as the complicated land tenure situation made if often difficult to distinguish 
between landlord and peasant. At the 1959 PKI Peasants' conference, the main 
target of reform efforts was seen as those "landlcirds"who were foreign or who 
actively supported or sympathised with the Darul Islam, the bands which, up to 
1962, terrorised some rural areas to fight for theestabiishment of an Islamic 
state. Peasants were divided into: 
120. For one case see J. Helmer and E. Weitering, op.cit., p. 43. 
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II( 1) 'Hich peasants v who are by nature 'semi-feudal', lease out excess land that 
they have ,and lend out money, although they may also work some of their own 
land; (2) 'middle peasants'? who usually? but not always have enough for their' 
own needs and are as a rule 'independent economically', although they too may be 
exploited by moneylenders or landlords; and (3) 'poor peasants and agricultural 
labourers' ,with little or no land, and who? as tenants or share ciVoppe rs , are 
wholly at the mercy of their landlords. n121 
In 1959 'rich peasants' were seen as neutral in the peasant struggle 
against 'landlords'. After the introduction of agrarian legislation, however,' 
all owners of more than 5 hectares of irrigated land in densely populated areaS 
or the equivalen-l; in other kinds , of, land were officially considered as landlords. 
During implementation of the reform more precise knowledge of the land 
tenu~ situation was neaded, add in early 1964, PKI leader Aidit launched and 
personally headed a campaign to investigate the rural situation in Central and 
East Java. About 200 research'workers and 2,500 assistants collaborated in 
, 122 this effort. 
It was noted: 
"As part of its intensive campaign to win adherents among the peasantry the PKI 
under Aidit has carried on extensive res,earch in land-tenure patterns in 
Indonesia; this was revealed very high oonoentrations of landownership in the 
hands of a few peasants and landlords in many areas. These data confirm the 
analyses made by non-Communist investigators at least in Java. ,,123 
The 1964 researcha:.lso tried to identify the "7 village devils": "wicked 
landlords, the blood-sucking money lenders ,the idjon dealers, wicked middlemen, 
the bureaucrat capitalists, wicked authorities and the village bandits". 124 The 
researoh stimulated the awareness of new rights and willingness to overcome 
traditional domination among the peasants, expressed in the unilateral actions 
that took place particularly in Central and East Java,. 
Beasants were classified more or less according to the criteria worked out 
in 1959, and the strategy of local peasant organisations of the BTl was designed 
in accordance with the findings. Landless agricultural labourers and tenants 
were the favourite"subjects of BTl action, but small owner-farmers with in-
sufficient land for their subsistence were also included in the base of the 
organisation. Family farmowners who had enough land for their SUbsistence were 
12,1. Justus M.van der Kroef, "Agrarian Reform and the Communist Party", ~ 
Eastern S1il~vey, 29, 1, January 1960, p. 6~ 
122. "Aidit completes research into conditions of peasants and peasants' 
movement", Review of Indonesia, VII, 5-6-7, Djakarta, May/June/July, 196~. 
123. Justus M.van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, Its Historl, 
Programme and Tactics (University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1965)? 
p. 147. 
124. "Aidit completes research etco", op.cit., po 28; ldjon is a type of 
usurious pawning of land and harvest. 
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als6-irldluded --i-n-th:e -base--of-the -()rga;nisati-on;--Family landowners-who- -had -enough 
land for their subsistence were seen as a group to collaborate with. Rich 
farmers who worked, at least part of their land were not considered enemies. The 
struggle was directed mainly against the landlords, those who lived off the 
land and off the tenants or sharecroppers who tilled it. It was this group 
which had surplus land as defined by the land reform law. Because of their 
wealth they were often also moneylenders and controlled many small farmers 
through indebtedness. 
It was difficult to persuade peasants in a society strongly dominated by a 
tradition of rukun (harmony) to take action against the landlords, generally 
the influential people of their village; however, the land tenure situation 
apparently contained so many - often deeply hidden - grievances and resentment 
that united action among peasants .could be stimulated. Formerly, such resent-
ment had been expressed only m~ly in traditional wajang (Shadow puppet theatre) 
themes, including that of "village devils". 
In particular to be able to counteract the hold that traditional leaders 
(often landlords ) had overthe peasants, Aidit and his collaborato,;t's made a 
special study of folkloric elements in each region, looking especially for 
''Progressive and patriotic tales and stories". One way in which landless 
peasants were ,mobilised to stand up for their new rights under the land reform 
law was to let them remember which lands, presently in the hands of some of the 
so-called "village devils", had belonged in the past to their own forefathers. 
Wherever cases of strife occurred, they were often related to the 
factional splits and politicaldivmsionsalready existing in the villages. In 
, some areas this was between PKI and the Nationalist Party, PNI (which often 
meant between poor peasants and better-off farmers or even landlords) and else-
where between pKI and the Orthodox Islamic Party, the NU (between poor peasants 
and hadji landlords). The religiQus issue may have provoked difficulties since 
land belonging to religious institutions, (wakaP:~ was not considered' available 
for distribution., It seems that hadji landlords often donated their _land 
nominally as w~p land. 125 Whenever accusations were made that peasants acted 
''Unilaterally'' by taking religious lands, it may well have been in such cases. 
At times serious clashes occurred between Islamic groups and BTl peasants. Thus,' 
at the village level, things often happened which upset village solidarity 
beyond the point of what was bearable. 
125. E. Utrecht, -op.cit., po 84. 
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Political factional strife also implied that some unilateral actions by 
the peasants were not directed exclusively against large landowners; they were 
also taken against small farmers who did not have excess land but who happened 
to belong to peasant organisations opposing the BTl. This complaint was made 
by leaders of Petani in June 1964. 126 On the other hand, it seems that ill 
some areas landlords who supported the PKI were not victim to unilateral actions, 
while their neighbours belonging to other parties were so troubled. Wertheim 
noted: 
"It is certain that there were instructions of the PKI not to discriminate 
between PKI and non-PKI and strictly to keep to the text of the Agrarian Law. 
But in view of the non-class composition of the party there is a good chance. 
that in several areas the accusations were not completely unfounded. ,,127 
The fact that in addition to the purely economic and legal aspects of the 
struggle for implementation of the land reform such religio-ideological 
(aliran) factors and local political factional strife entered, probabiy enhanced 
the bitterness of the struggle. 128 
For the PNI and its peasant organisation Petani the struggle was 
particularly painful, since Petani had in its ranks many better-off farmers 
who had to lose from the land reform. PHI peasant organisation members were 
instructed not to choose the side of the landowners but of the· poor peasants, 
but peasants' unilateral actions were condemned. There was a danger of more and 
more Petanimembers leaving their organisations and joining BTl ranks. Consider-
able polemics resulted between PNI and PKI forces, expressed through their 
respective daily newspapers Merdeka and Harian Rakjat, andPNl .became in-
creasingly divided over the issue. 129 
In mid-1964, probably under pressure of PNl and in. the absence of President 
Sukarno, the governm:ent ordered a start to settling,;.agrarian disputes through 
mutual consultation. The PKI at a· National Conference in July 1964 requested 
the establishment of land reform courts which would include representatives of 
126. B. Gunawan, op_cit., p. 51. 
127. W.F.Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle", op.cit., p. 17. 
128. ~.; see also E. Utrecht, op.cit., p. 83. 
129. For a summary of the polemics see B. Gunawan, Kudeta, op.cH .. , pp. 98-110; 
in mid-1965 a split . occurred in the PNl partly as a result of the in-
creasing inner tension over the land reform issue. 
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the peasant'-organisationsti President Sukarno in the August -17,. 1964 (In-
dependence Day) speech expressed understanding for the unilateral action 
movefltent,' and the establishment of reform courts was announced. The actions 
oontinued, at times leading-to violent olashes. suoh. as in.October 1964 in 
Indramaju involving 2,000 peasants,where several policemen were injured. 130 
It was probably this kind of "impulsive" aotion by BTlwhiohmade Aidit remark 
in a parly report in May 1965 that/ lithe peasant movement.· must proceed in a 
framework of strict disoipline.,,131 Some authors suggest that the movement 
was getting "out of hand". 132 
Land Reform Courts were created by the Minister of Justioe after Law No. 21 
of 1964 had been promulgated to that effeot on 31st Ootober 19640 As a result, 
almost all .available.land, about 300,000 hectares, was distributed in Java, 
Madura, Bali,Lombok and Sumbawa by the. end of the year, aooordingto a report 
by the Agrarian Minister .. t33 Figures regarding.the results of land reform <;:l.t 
the end of 1969, supplied by the General Directorate of Agrarian Affairs .of the 
Department of Home Affairs, give an impression of the souroe of the land 
distributed. 
For the First Phase ooveringJava and. the Lesser Sunda Islands, the total 
number of heotares distributed had notohanged since the end. of 1964-, covering 
about 300,000 heotares. Half of this land was. national domain and only 
65,132 hectares oame from surplus land of landowners who .had. more than the 
maximum amountbf 5 heotares. This irldicates. that landlo:rds on the whdlle were. 
only partly affeoted,in view ()fthefaot thatt.h: .official objeotive of the 
distribution of surplus land was 112,500 hectares. 
Absentee landldrdswere treated even more leniently, aocording to the 
offioialobjeotive. While 22,000 hectares were supposedly availab+e,. only. 
8,600 hectares'( of 18 ,000 ~bsentee .owners) were .distribu"\i~d. 134 This poor 
130. Guy J. Pauker, ''The Rise and Fall of theCommun:Lst Party. of Indonesia", 
p. 43. 
131. lli!!. 
132. E. Utrecht, op.cit., po 83. 
1J3. lli!!., p. 85. 
134. This figure, presented in 1970, should .. be compared with t'hat for Java, 
Madura etc. of 55,910 absentee landowners, given in January 1965 by the 
Agrarian Minister; quoted in E. Utrecht, op.cito, po 78, note 14. 
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Table IV. List of Distributed Lands under Land Reform until Deoember 1969~ 
Stage I 
(Java and Lesser Available land Number of Heotares Number of 
Sunda Islands) (hectares) Owners Distributed Benefioiaries 
Affected 
Surplus lands 112,524 8,967 65,132 100,477 
Absentee owners' lands 22,084 18,421 8,610 29,324 
Princ ipal i ty lands 73,566 ' 73,566 79,856 
State lands 147,344 147,192 383,301 
Total Stage I 355,518 27,388 
'.' 
294,500 592,958 
=======================================~==============,=========================== 
Stage II 
~Rest of ,Indonesia) Available land Number of Hectares Number of 
mainly after 1965 in (he cti:tre s ) Owners Distributed Beneficiaries 
Sumatra) . '. .. Affeoted . 
Surplus~ lands 49,001 77 34,~48 25,981 
Absentee owners' lands . 8,132 8,026 9,239 
Prinoipality lands 52,712 37,850 53,244 
State lands 473,538 307,774 185,561 
Total Stage Il 583,383 77 388,198 274,025 
==================================================================~============== 
~ Data supplied in 1970 by Direotor-General of Agrarian Affairs of the Depart-
ment of Home Affairs. 
performance should be seen .in the light of the fact that the land reform law 
could be interpreted as abolishing absentee ownership altogether. Article 10 
stated: 
,,( 1) Every person and every corporate body having a certain right on agricultural 
land, is in principle obliged to cultivate or to exploit it actively by himself 
while. avoiding extortionate methods. 
( 2) The. implementation .. of the provision in paragraph (1) of this Art icle shall 
be further regulated by. legislative regulation. 
(3) Except~ons to the principle ment.ionedin paragraph (1) of this Artiole shall 
be regulated by legislative regulation. 1I135 ' . 
The lack of .clarity of the le~l stipUlations was apparently a source of 
confliot in the rural areas and was partly responl?ible for the ut ilisat ion by 
135. Act No.5 of the Year 1960ConC?erning:sas~9.Ji~lati,~n.s. .on Agr,arian , 
Principles, Speci~l};ssue, 920/1967,,;I)§partment of Inf?rz.nation, Republic 
of IndoneSia, Article 10; I.B.R.D., opooit.;-p-: 33 observed:' "If we 
interpret Article 10 correctly, absentee ownership was not permitted." 
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peasantsofciv-ildj;Bobedi~nceand other non--violentbactics,- such as unilateraL 
• f', " ,. I " •• 
actions, occupation and cooperative cultivation of plots which were considered 
to illegitimately remain in the hands of landlords. 
rrhe frequency~nd size of;, the un:L1ateralactdtons was difficult ,to estimate. 
The fact that in August 1964 President Sukarno more or less endorsed the 
movement and that', during the second half of 1964, meCj,sures were taken to 
drastically accelerate the stagnant land reform programme, may indiqate that 
the unilateral action movement took cim considerable proportions. This would 
indicate how effectively the peasants were organised by BTl and PKI. Militancy 
is gen~rally not considered a characteristic of Javanese peasants, and the 
traditional approach a.t the village l~vel has always been the search for 
compromise and harmony. The fact that in a good many instances this pattern was 
abolished seems to show how far the process of de-traditionalis.aticm l+a,d gone 
inJaya~, On the whole it seems thai -lorial peopl€! 'took the new course of events 
for granted and about half. a million peasants were able to benefit from land 
reform in a relatively short time (the second half of 1964). After this, the 
unilateral action movement apparently lost some of its impulse. , It seems that 
during the rapid land distribution in the second half of 1964 little violence 
occurred •. 
The 1965 Massacre , 
Some kind of reaction by rural elites, particularly the Islamic local leaders 
who had lost influence or w~'re threatened by the new dev~lopment.s, co~ldbe 
expected. This happened after the failure of the coup o.'etat by dissident 
. • , .I' :;..", "". "./' ,': .. \: , "',' ; . ,:, " :, .'- 'I _-
Army ~fficers, allegedly related to ~lementsof the PKI, on 30 September 1965 
(the Gestapu). 136 Du.~i~g the Gestapu'five notori'otielY anti-communist generals' 
were assassinated by a group of high-ranking offioers and their sympathisers, 
headed ,by 001. Untung. 
A wave of terror swe:Qt the rural areas ,part'icularliof Oen~ral' and East 
Java and Bali at the end. of 1965, which pmo1iically elimimtedthe BTl and PJCI. 
This, massacre was mainly organised~y the para,;"o~llImand~ troops of the Army in 
October 1965, in reaction to the assassination of the generals. 
'" , 
136. See W .F.Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup", Paoifio 
Affairs, XXXIX, 1 & '2, Spring and Suriuner 1966. 
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As one recent report noted: 
"In the aftermath of those assassinations, numerous PKI cadres allover 
Indonesia were liquidated by the Indonesian Army's security operations, guided 
and supported in many instances in.East Java by members of the Nahdatul Ulama 
(Moslem) Party and in Central Java and Bali by members of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (PNI). These killings released pent-up sooial tensions 
.generated by thePKI's aggressive agrarian polioies of 1963-1965 and touched off 
a rural massacre in which several hundred thousand PKI followers lost their 
lives. "137 
A Pulitzer Prize winning report described as follows what has been called 
"one of history's worst orgies of slashing, shooting, chopping violence": 
'~housands of lndonesians who were members of the Communist Party, or who 
supported it, or who were suspected of supporting it, or who were said by some-
body to have supported it, were put ruthlessly to death. In .the mayhem, people 
innocent of Communist affiliations were killed too, sometimes by mistake, some-
times because their old enemies were paying off grudges in the guise of an anti-
Communist oampaign. ,,138 . 
Some authors saem to suggest that the massacre was carried out by the 
villagers against elements which they considered as the cause of "disruption 
of village solidarity" and its replacement by "class conflict".139 In some 
areas, such as Bali, where BTl and PKI activists seem to have neglected to 
integrate their action into local cultural and religious traditions,140 this may 
have been the case. On the whole, however, and particularly in East and Central 
Java, many sources indicate that the ca.mpa~gn was initiated outside the village 
and carried out mostly by non-villagers or young members of the village elite. 
Para-commandos of the Army played the initiating role and members of the 
orthodox Islamic youth organisation ANSOR were trained by the Army to carry 
through the campaign. Many of these youngsters were sons or relatives of the 
traditional local leaders and landowners (hadjis).141 Village solidarity was 
then disappearing anyway due to the increasing indebtedness and loss of land by 
smallholders and the competition between political parties from the early 1950s 
onward .• 
137. Guy J. Pauker, 'lThe Rise an.d Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia", 
pp. v-vi. 
138. John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (David McKay Company, Inco, New York, 
1967), p.153~ .. . 
139. Guy J. Pauker, ''Political Consequences of Rural Development Programmes in 
140. 
Indonesia", Pacific Affairs, XLI, 3, Fall 1968, pp. 389-90. . 
John Hughes, op.cit., pp. 175-83; Philippe Gavi, Konterrevolution in 
Indonesien(Europaische Verlagsanstalt, FrankfUrt, 1968), p. 40, indicated 
that only in Bali and Madura did more civilians than military men .. . 
participate in the assassinations. 
1410 Data from a study by Lance Castles quoted in W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia 
Before and After the Untung Coup", op .cit., p. 6. 
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The massacre started about 20th October 1965 -in the Klaten area in Central 
Java, an area where serious agrarian tension had prevailed and where groups of 
Communists tried to organise armed resistance. The killing was soon extended 
to areas where no resistance existed but where land reform had interfered with 
the interests of wealthy, mainly Moslim, landowners, such as Kediri or Banjumas 
in Central Java. Particularly for these areas newspaper reporters indioated the 
role of the Islamic youth groups, stimulated by the Army in the killings mainly 
of poorer peasants~142 
Nowadays it is often said that the PKI cadres had lists of local landlords 
and religious leaders (often landowning hadjis) who were to be eliminated as 
soon as the opportunity was ripe. It is not possible to check the truth of this 
accusation, but it was apparently strongly believed among better-off circles. 
This fear may partly explain the ferocity with which PKI cadres and members 
were persecuted and killed. Initially in Central Java some civil war type, of 
struggle was waged between PKI and BTl on the one side and ,the Army on the 
other side, but on the whole Communists and their followers seem to have given 
little resistance. 
BTl and,PKI members were not assassinated in all areas; imprisonment was 
more common in regions outside Central and East Java and Bali. 
In West Java cases were observed where a kind of razzia on communists was 
organised by village councils of terkemuka's (influentials"r.generally belonging 
to the elite) at ,the request of higher local autherities. There' was no Army 
intervention in these cases and no violence. Members of Communist organisations 
were later screened by the military and jailed for longer or shorter periods. 
" 143 After returning to, the village their movements were controlled. A campaign >, 
to spread Islamic religion was carried out as a counterweight to 'former 
, 't" t 144 Communist influence, and supported by the military and the kabupa en govarnmen • 
Since the basic problems behind peasant unrest have not been s9lved and 
are not being attended to, the potential for peasant protest, probably more 
radical than what developed between 1953 and 1965, remains~ Thus, a recent 
Ford Foundation report noted the laok of enduring political stability in the 
country, resultingfrom not solving basic issues Such as the contrasts in rural 
areas, as follows: 
142. SeYmour Topping of New York Times and Frank Palmos of The Sun (Australia), 
quoted by W.F .. Wertheim, ,lli,!!., po 8; also John Hughes, op.cit., pp. 152-61. 
143. J. Helmer and E. Weitering, opocit., p. 20. 
144. ~o, pp. 4-5 and 22-24. 
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"']:he main problem here is that political stability lias so far been achieved 
through the suppression of PKI, the Communist ~arty» for long the largest and 
best organised party in Indonesia. The PKI claimed to have 300,000 cadres when 
it celebrated its 45th anniversary in May 1965. According to recent estimates 
of the Government, Some 200,000 cadres have escaped location and elimination 
in spite of the mass-lynchings going on in 1965 and the fact that over 100,000 
susp~c:l!~d communists are currently detained in makeshift prison camps throughout 
Java. ' 
In other words,two~thirds of the hard-core members of the PKI are suspected to 
be still at large and can be, expected to seize every opportunity to undermine 
the authority of tne Government. In a country where student groups, political 
parties, religious groupings, functional organisations, and even seotions of the 
armed forces are constantly engaged in a tug of war, there is of course ample 
opportunity to playoff one section of the community against the other. 
The issue of land reform in Java has proved to be particularly attractive for 
exploitation by the PKI. Nearly 90 percent of the villagers in Central and 
Southern Java do not own the land they cultivate. Peasants work on leased land, 
retaining only 40 per cent of the harvest, the rest constituting rent payment 0 
Although a reform of this situation has be,en proposed for many years, it has 
n0ver been carried out. Neither has the Suharto Government taken up the issue 
in earnest. 91145 
Effects on Land Reform 
Except for effects in the Outer Island, where naticilnal domain land was available, 
the land redistribution programme was virtually stopped. In several cases lands 
that had been distributed in Java or the Lesser Sunda Islands were taken back 
by the former owners, the beneficiaries being arrested or assassinated as part 
of the massacre. These activities took on such proportions that the government 
had to do somethingg 
"In an effort to save what positive results land reform had achieved, the then 
Agrarian Minister issued an instruction on 10 December 1965 (NoQ 42-PLP-1965) 
which contained orders vto take measures against former landowners and other 
people who abuse the actions against the G-3Q-S (the abortive coup of 1 October 
1965) by taking back illegally redistributed land or by obstructing re-
distribution through intimidations, insinuations, etc. v This instruction does 
not appear to have been very effective. Although it probably stopped unconcealed 
taking back of redistributed land .(in west Java legal action was taken in Banten, 
Krawang and Tasikmalaja, in Central Java in Tegal, Pekalongan and Demak, in East 
Java in the former residency of Besuki), reversal of land redistribution, probably 
continued surreptitiously and further redistribution virtually stopped during 
the years 1966 and 19670 91146 
One reason why formers owners tried to take back the land they had lost in 
the reform programme was that reimbursement had no'~ taken place according to 
the legal regulations. DUring the years after 1965 a main aotivity of the 
1450Herman Hatzfeldt, "Economio Development Planning in Indonesia" (The Ford 
Foundation, Bangkok, mimeo., June 1969), po 69. 
146. E. Utreoht, o·Pocit., po 86. 
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One of the most important land reform measures, the fifty-fifty sharing of 
proceeds, was practically abandoned after 1965. Because the militant peasant 
organisations were virtually destroyed or dismantled, there was no longer any 
pressure to fulfil the legal stipulations. In most cases the share'of the 
cultivator became again the t.raditi.onal one-third. Land reform authorities, 
lacking a militant .peasant organisation, had no way to enforce the 50:50 agree--
148· . 
ment 0 Local informants indicated that peasants did no.t :insist on their 
right s out of fear of be ing aocused as a "communiSt" or part ic ipant in the 
Gestapu (coup of September 1965) and then being persecuted as such. 
The land reform issue is prudently kept alive by a few peasant organisations 
such as the Petani, but others, such as the peasant, organisation of the 
orthodox Islamic Nahdatul lnama which has many landowners among its membership, 
are proposing to. abandon the present law, denouncing it as "c()nimunistic", and 
to increase the limit of sawah land that ll!Lndholders can own to at least 7.5 
hectares, instead of the present five. 149 For the time being at least, prospects 
for agrarian reform in Indonesia appear rather gloomy. 
1470 Informationsuppll.ed by the Directorate General of Agrarian Affairs of the . 
. Ministr;y- of Home 'Affairs. 
148. ~o 
149. Interviews with Chairmen of various organisations in 1970 and 1971. 
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